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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In their respective paramount articles, Strong and 
Koch describe the apparent tension between the law of 
arbitration and the law of trusts in common law jurisdictions 
with expressions such as “Two Bodies of Law Collide” or “A 
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Tale of Two Cities.”3 On one hand, much of this current 
tension is reportedly caused by the equity nature of the trust 
institution in Anglo-American law. On the other hand, the 
tension also arises from arbitration laws that require 
arbitration agreements to be contained in contracts or for 
such agreements to be related to contracts. We embarked on 
the interesting task of determining whether the same tension 
exists between the law of trusts in civil law jurisdictions and 
arbitration laws modeled by the UNCITRAL Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (UNCITRAL Model 
Law). In particular, we chose to focus on the Mexican trust, 
arguably the first and most influential trust instrument in 
the civil law world, and on Mexico’s commercial arbitration 
law (which is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985). 
As our comparative law analysis progressed, we found out 
that some of the points that differentiate the Mexican trust 
from its Anglo-American trust ancestor, coupled with the 
flexibility that characterizes the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
eliminate most of the legal incompatibility reported in some 
common law jurisdictions. Profiting from the descriptive 
expressions used by our common law colleagues, Strong and 
Koch, this work gathers legal evidence and provides a 
thorough analysis to answer the question of whether 
arbitration and Mexican trusts are “A Couple Made for Each 
Other” . . . affirmatively. 
Section II of this paper furnishes some important 
information about the Mexican trust to set the basis for our 
proposition. Section III forecasts the benefits that arbitration 
                                                
	
	
3 S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 
VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 1157 (2012); Christopher P. Koch, A Tale of Two 
Cities! - Arbitrating Trust Disputes and the ICC's Arbitration Clause for Trust 
Disputes, 2 Y.B. ON INT’L ARB. 180 (2012). 
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will ultimately bring to the Mexican trust industry and to the 
parties of Mexican trusts. Section IV introduces the main 
legal issues that must be carefully considered to achieve the 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement in trusts disputes, 
from a global perspective. Section V addresses, in minute 
detail, the requirements and theories of intent that make an 
arbitration agreement enforceable against all trust parties. 
Section VI discusses what type of trusts claims are arbitrable 
from a Mexican law standpoint. Section VII highlights some 
legal capacity rules that may affect the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements over parties to a Mexican trust.  
Section VIII identifies some procedural and representation 
measures to be taken in order to ensure compliance with due 
process and the right to be heard principles in the context of 
Mexican trust disputes. Section XI analyzes two examples of 
mandatory norms of law that could give rise to the public 
policy exception for enforcement of arbitral awards in the 
context of arbitration of Mexican trusts disputes. Section X 
concludes with some reflections on the current perception of 
arbitration as a means to resolve Mexican trust disputes and 
its future. 
 
II. THE MEXICAN TRUST 
 
The first Mexican Trust provisions were enacted in 
1924.4 This set of provisions closely followed the Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act enacted in the United States in 1922.5  Both 
                                                
	
	
4 See Ley General de Instituciones de Crédito y Establecimientos 
Bancarios [LGICEB] [General Law of Credit Institutions and Banking 
Establishments], (Dec. 24, 1924) (Mex.), available at 
http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/6/2791/16.pdf. 
5 LUIS CARLOS FELIPE DÁVALOS MEJÍA, TÍTULOS Y OPERACIONES DE 
CRÉDITO: ANÁLISIS TEÓRICO PRÁCTICO DE LA LEY GENERAL DE TÍTULOS Y 
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the American Act and the Mexican Trust rules regulated the 
power and obligations of trustees only.6 None of them dealt 
with the trust institution itself. Most of the law of trusts in 
the United States was still in the form of judicial precedent, 
largely from England.7 Ten years later, in 1932, Mexico 
became the first country to codify its trust law in a 
comprehensive manner in its Ley General de Titulos y 
Operaciones de Crédito (“LGTOC”).8 This was achieved after 
two prior significant legislative attempts.9 The U.S. 
equivalent, the Uniform Trusts Act of 1937, followed only 
five years later.10 The drafts and prior statutes that led to the 
trust provisions in Mexico’s LGTOC were clearly based on 
the U.S. trust law at the time.11 However, the Mexican trust12 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
OPERACIONES DE CRÉDITO Y TEMAS AFINES 541 (Oxford Univ. Press, 4th 
ed. 2012). 
6 The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 661 (1924) (“An Act 
concerning liability for participation in breaches of fiduciary obligations 
and to make uniform the law with reference thereto.”). 
7 John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United 
States?, 58 ALABAMA L. REV. 1069, 1069-71, 1081 (2007). In 1935, the 
Restatement of Trust gathered the trust law principles developed by 
Equity and Common Law Courts. Id. at 1069 n.5. 
8 Ley General de Titulos y Operaciones de Credito [LGTOC] [General 
Law of Securities and Credit Operations], ch. V, sec. I-II, art. 381–407, 
Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DOF] (Aug. 27, 1932), ultima reforma 
June 13, 2014 (Mex.). 
9 This was achieved after two prior non-negligible legislative attempts: 
the Ley de Bancos de Fideicomisos of 1926 and the Ley General de 
Instituciones de Crédito y Establecimientos Bancarios of 1926. 
10 MEJÍA, supra note 5, at 541. 
11 MARIA EUGENIA RETTEG, UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE FACULTÉ DE DROIT, THE 
MEXICAN FIDEICOMISO: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL APPROACH 15 
(2009), available at 
http://www.unige.ch/droit/mbl/upload/pdf/M_moire_RETTEG.pdf 
(Mexican “legislators decided to try and adapt the Anglo – Saxon Trust 
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was born with a distinctive twist. The LGTOC gave the 
Mexican trust an evident contractual character, which 
scholars attribute to the influence that the Mexico Federal 
Civil Code of 1928 (Mexico FCC) had over the LGTOC.13  
Since then, the Mexican trust has become a reference for 
many civil law jurisdictions, particularly in Latin American 
countries. As a result, today Mexico is one of the major trust 
jurisdictions in the civil law world. 
 
A. LEGAL NATURE 
 
Pursuant to Article 381 LGTOC, “[b]y virtue of the 
trust, the settlor conveys to a fiduciary institution [trustee] 
the property of certain assets or rights, for those to be 
destined to lawful and determined goals, entrusting the 
fulfillment of such purposes to the fiduciary institution 
[trustee].”  Because neither the LGTOC nor the Mexico Code 
of Commerce (“CCo.”) expressly characterizes the institution 
of trust within any of the so-called “sources” of legal 
obligations in Mexican law,14 the legal community has 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
to the Mexican Law. As a result, there were many projects of acts that 
tried to establish the fideicomiso in the legislation. The first of these 
attempts took place in 1905 with the Limantour Project, which was the 
first to adapt the Trust to a Roman law system. The second attempt was 
in 1924 with the Creel Project, which was based on the functioning of the 
‘American Trusts and Saving Banks’. In 1924 the LGICEB was created 
and this second project had an effective influence on the first official 
regulation of the Mexican fideicomiso.” (footnote omitted)). 
12 Mexican trust means one created and governed under Mexican law. 
13 MEJÍA, supra note 5, at 542. 
14 Pursuant to Mexican law, obligations may arise out of the following 
sources: contracts, unilateral declarations of intent, unjust enrichment, 
and torts (responsabilidad extra-contractual due to risk created or strict 
liability). 
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frequently debated its legal nature. Some scholars argue that 
Mexican courts, including the Supreme Court of Justice, 
have repeatedly maintained that the Mexican trust is 
contractual in nature.15 Other legal scholars maintain that a 
trust is a fiduciary transaction that ultimately has the legal 
nature of a contract under Mexican law.16 
 
B. PARTIES 
 
Like the Anglo-American trust, there are three main 
parties to a Mexican trust: the settlor (fideicomitente), the 
trustee (institución fiduciaria), and the beneficiaries 
(fideicomisarios). Occasionally a fourth party, a technical 
committee, also acts as party to a Mexican trust. A settlor is 
required for a Mexican trust to exist. Through the settlor’s 
declaration of intent, the first element to create a trust is 
accomplished. Both individuals and entities may be settlors 
as long as they have the capacity to transfer legal ownership 
of the subject matter of the trust, whether assets or rights, 
and the legal capacity to enter into commercial agreements.17  
In addition, government or administrative bodies may act as 
settlors where authorized by their statute and charter.18 This 
                                                
	
	
15 MEJÍA, supra note 5, at 554-557 (reporting a series of Mexican Supreme 
Court decisions upholding the contractual nature of trusts under 
Mexican law); see e.g., Fideicomiso, Naturaleza del., Pleno de la Suprema 
Corte de Justicia [SCJN], Informe de la Suprema Corte de Justicia, Séptima 
Época, Primera Parte, 1986, Tesis 32, Amparo en revision 769/84, 675 
(Mex.) (holding that the trust is a legal business through which the 
settlor creates a set of independent assets, which is autonomous from the 
parties to the contract, which title is granted to the trustee for the 
achievement of its determined goal.). 
16 MEJÍA, supra note 5, at 560. 
17 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 384 (Mex.). 
18 Id. 
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work does not address Mexican public trusts, which are 
created by the government.19 
According to Article 381 of the LGTOC, the trustee is 
also a (sine qua non) party to the Mexican trust.20 Only legal 
entities (never a natural person) may serve as trustees. 
Moreover, only legal entities authorized by law,21 generally 
                                                
	
	
19 Despite the fact that most of what is submitted in this article will hold 
true where a state entity is involved, issues of arbitrability and capacity 
would require a more detailed analysis due to the current treatment of 
arbitration by Mexican public procurement and administrative rules. 
20 Trustee involvement is vital to create a Mexican trust. This conclusion 
can be drawn from LGTOC Article 385, which reads as follows: “when as 
a result of resignation or removal the trustee concludes its services as 
such, a replacement trustee shall be designated. Where this replacement 
is not possible, the trust will extinguish.” LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 385 
(Mex.) (author’s translation). 
21 Id. The following entities are allowed to act as trustees: credit 
institutions, insurance companies, guarantee institutions, brokerage 
firms, financial corporations with limited capacity to act only in financial 
matters, general storage warehouses, the Mexican National Bank, and 
National Savings and Financial Services Banks. For general storage 
warehouses, see id. at ch.V, sec. II, art. 395; for insurance companies, see 
Ley General de Instituciones y Sociedades Mutualistas de Seguros 
[LGISMS] [General Law for Insurance Institutions and Companies], ch. 
II, art. 34, frac. IV, as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 
(Aug. 31, 1935) (Mex.); for insurance companies, see also Ley de 
Instituciones de Seguros y de Fianzas [LISF] [Law for Insurance and 
Bond Institutions], ch. I, sec. I, art. 118, Pfo. XXIII, as amended, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DO], (Apr. 14, 2013) (Mex.); for guarantee 
institutions, see Ley Federal de Instituciones de Fianzas [LFIF] [Federal 
Law for Bond Institutions], ch. II, art. 16, Pfo. XV, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO], (Dec. 29, 1950) (Mex.); for brokerage firms, see Ley del 
Mercado de Valores [LMV] [Law for Stock Market], ch. II, sec. II, art. 183, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], (Dec. 30, 2005) (Mex.); for financial 
corporations with limited object, see Ley General de Organizaciones y 
Actividades Auxiliares de Crédito [LGOC] [General Law of Auxiliary 
Credit Organizations and Activities], title V, ch. 1, art. 87-Ñ, Diario 
2015 ARBITRATION OF MEXICAN TRUST DISPUTES 9 
banks and financial corporations, may request an 
authorization from the National Bank and Stock 
Commission (“CNBV”)22 to operate as trustee.23 This 
authorization covers the trustee’s capacity to act as such.  
Pursuant to Article 382 of the LGTOC, any person 
with legal capacity to receive the benefits of the trust may be 
a beneficiary.24  Furthermore, the beneficiary has to be born, 
or at least be conceived, at the time of the settlor’s death in 
order to be entitled to receive the benefits of the trust. Also, 
unless it is a guarantee trust, the trustee shall not be a 
beneficiary of the trust.25  
If the settlor so wishes, he may set up a “technical 
committee,” either at the trust’s creation or in a subsequent 
modification of the trust deed.  The settlor determines the 
functioning, purpose, rights, members, etc., of the technical 
committee.26 The technical committee usually serves as a 
supervisory board that ensures the achievement of the 
trust’s rules and objectives. For example, the settlor may 
stipulate the type of decisions or tasks that shall be 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
Oficial de la Federación [DO], (Jan. 14, 1985) (Mex.); for the Mexican 
National Bank, see Ley Del Banco de México [LBM] [Law for the Bank of 
Mexico], art. 7, Pfo. XI, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], (Dec. 23, 
1993) (Mex.); for national savings and financial services bank, see Ley 
Orgánica del Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros 
[LOBANSF] [Organic Law for the National Savings and Financial 
Services Bank], ch. II, art. 7, Pfo. VII & VIII, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO], (June 1, 2001) (Mex.). 
22 Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores. 
23 Ley de Instituciones de Crédito [LIC] [Law for Credit Institutions], ch. 
IV, art. 80, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] (July 19, 1990) (Mex.). 
24 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 382, Pfo. 1 (Mex.). 
25 Id. at Pfo. 4. 
26 LIC, ch. IV, art. 80 (Mex.). 
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performed by the trustee in accordance with the technical 
committee’s instructions.27 
 
C. TYPES 
 
Although the law provides no catalogue of the 
different types of trusts under Mexican law, scholarship has 
provided one using different criteria, such as: personal 
elements, goals, and structure. Types include the irrevocable 
trust,28 the investment trust,29 the management trust,30 the 
guarantee trust,31 the public trust,32 the testamentary trust,33 
                                                
	
	
27 Id. Article 80 of the LIC provides that when the trustee is acting upon 
the technical committee’s request, as long as these instructions are lawful 
and in accordance with the trust’s purpose, the trustee will not be held 
liable for damages. Id. 
28 Where the assets are definitively transferred to the trustee with no 
possibility for the settlor to revoke such transfer. 
29 The life insurance trust and retirement plan (for employees) trust, 
among others, are generally structured as an investment trust. 
30 The ultimate purpose of this trust is to transfer all the managerial work 
related to the assets and have the settlor benefit from them (by 
designating himself as beneficiary). 
31 This type of trust is expressly regulated by the LGTOC in Articles 395-
406. LGTOC, ch. V, sec. II, arts. 395-406 (Mex.) (listing the institutions 
and corporations that are allowed to act as trustees in these trusts in art. 
395). In these types of trusts, trustees are allowed to act as beneficiaries 
when the trust is created to provide a guarantee in benefit of the trustee. 
Id. at art. 396. 
32 This type of trust is created for the purpose of assisting the executive 
branch of the government in the promotion and support of certain 
activities for the social and economic development of the country; its 
purpose is of public interest always. 
33 This type of trust is settled by a unilateral declaration of intent made 
by the settlor, and takes effect after his death. The trustee is given the 
task to manage the assets. The persons designated as beneficiaries must 
be alive or at least conceived at the time of the settlor’s death LGTOC. It 
2015 ARBITRATION OF MEXICAN TRUST DISPUTES 11 
and those trusts that are unlawful, such as the secret trust 
and the successive trust.34 
 
D. THE MAIN DIFFERENCES WITH ANGLO-AMERICAN 
TRUSTS 
 
The Anglo-American trust and the Mexican trust are 
very similar since the former is modeled after the latter (see 
Section II above). Notwithstanding this fact, the Mexican 
trust differs from the Anglo-American trust in some 
important ways. Unlike the Anglo-American trust, which is 
considered to create a legal relationship that arises out of an 
equitable obligation (see Section V below),35 the Mexican 
trust is considered a contract (see Section II.A. above). In 
addition, pursuant to Mexican law, only institutions 
expressly authorized by law may serve as trustees (see 
Section II.B. above); under the Anglo-American trusts law, 
any capable person, either an individual or a legal entity, 
may serve as trustee.36  Likewise, Mexican law of trusts 
establishes a clear restriction to the designation of 
beneficiaries who shall exist or at least be conceived at the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
is revocable and becomes irrevocable after the death of the settlor. 
LGTOC, ch. V, art. 394, frac. II (Mex.). 
34 The purpose of every trust must be made perfectly clear; failing to do 
so will have the consequence of presuming that its purpose is secret and 
this would cause it to be null and void under Mexican law. In addition, 
Mexican law prohibits trusts in which the benefit is given to several 
persons that should substitute each other successively upon the death of 
the previous beneficiary. The only exception to this principle is when 
beneficiaries are alive or conceived at the moment of death of the settlor. 
35 JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
386, 387 (9th ed. 2013); ALASTAIR HUDSON, UNDESTANDING EQUITY & 
TRUSTS 12 (2d ed. 2004). 
36 ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY & TRUSTS 237-38 (3d ed. 2003).  
12 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
time of the settlor’s death (see Section II.B. above). This is not 
so with the Anglo-American trust.37 Moreover, under the 
Anglo-American law of trusts it is possible for the same 
person or entity to be the trustee and beneficiary or the 
settlor and trustee at the same time, so long as the same 
person does not assume all three capacities (settlor, trustee 
and beneficiary).38 Under Mexican law, the trustee may 
never be a beneficiary because this makes the trust null and 
void (unless the settlor creates a guarantee trust).39 Anglo-
American trusts may be settled in an implied or oral 
fashion,40 unlike the Mexican trusts, which are only valid in 
writing.41 
 
E. THE APPLICATION OF MEXICO’S COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION LAW TO MEXICAN TRUST DISPUTES 
 
Pursuant to Article 1 of the LGTOC, all acts and credit 
operations falling under its scope of application are deemed 
“acts of commerce.”42 Accordingly, the Mexican trust is an 
act of commerce. As such, the Mexican trust is also governed 
by the provisions of Mexico’s CCo. and the relevant banking 
                                                
	
	
37 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 35, at 417.  
38 Id. at 402. 
39 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. II, art. 396 (Mex.). 
40 “The United States’ law of trusts does not require a writing to create a 
valid trust. However, in the United States a testamentary trust must be in 
writing to satisfy the Wills Act, and an inter-vivos trust of land to satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds.” See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 35, at 427.  
41 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 387 (Mex.). 
42 Mexican law still follows the old dichotomy that distinguishes between 
civil acts primarily governed by the civil code provisions and the so-
called acts of commerce primarily governed by the Mexico Code of 
Commerce and mercantile laws. 
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and trade usages.43  However, a Mexican trust may involve 
parties (i.e. settlors or beneficiaries) that are non-traders or 
that do not pursue any business objective in the trust.44 In 
this scenario, scholars would find that such a Mexican trust 
might be considered a “mixed act,” where those non-trader 
parties to the Mexican trust will enjoy the special treatment 
granted by the civil code provisions.45 We agree that some 
mandatory rules of law contained in the civil code and other 
non-commercial law statutes shall apply to non-trader 
parties (see e.g. Sections VII.B., VIII, and IX below). 
However, we submit that the provisions on commercial 
arbitration in Articles 1415-1480 of the CCo. shall govern 
arbitration disputes arising out of Mexican trusts 
(particularly where the seat of arbitration is in Mexico), 
irrespective of whether one or more non-trader parties are 
involved in the trust relationship. We find support in Article 
1050 of the CCo., which provides that whenever an act has a 
business nature for one of the parties and a civil nature for 
                                                
	
	
43 LGTOC, art. 2o (Mex.). Acts of commerce are those falling within the 
definition established by the same Code of Commerce, irrespective of the 
persons who perform those acts (see Código de Comercio [CCo.] 
[Commercial Code], art. 1, Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], (Dec. 13, 
1889) (Mex.)). Generally, an act of commerce pursues a goal of economic 
speculation or a profit purpose, which does not need to be expressed in 
the contract, but is rather assessed on a case-by-case basis. (see id. at art. 
75, fracs. XIV & XXIV (Mex.)). 
44 So-called civil transactions are executed by parties who do not 
ordinarily enter into the transaction with a profit purpose and cannot be 
considered as traders under the Mexico Code of Commerce or as 
suppliers under Mexico consumer protection law. See generally Código 
de Comercio [CCo.] [Commercial Code], Diario Oficial de la Federacion 
[DO], (Dec. 13, 1889) (Mex.). 
45 SOYLA H. LEÓN & HUGO GONZALEZ GARCÍA, DERECHO MERCANTIL 155 
(2007). 
14 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
the other party, any dispute that arises out of the transaction 
at stake will be governed by the business law (i.e. the 
CCo.).46 Against this background, a Mexican trust will 
always have a business nature for at least one of the (sine 
qua non) parties: the trustee. Therefore, the arbitration 
provisions in any of the civil codes of the thirty-one Mexican 
states shall not apply to the resolution of trust disputes. 
 
III. BENEFITS OF ARBITRATION FOR THE TRUST INDUSTRY AND 
THE PARTIES INVOLVED 
	
A. ECONOMIC BENEFITS: A FAST AND FLEXIBLE PROCEDURE  
 
Litigation is not always as fast and effective as it 
should be. This ultimately results in increased costs for the 
parties. Various elements affect the resolution of disputes in 
state courts. For instance, state courts are frequently 
overloaded with cases and understaffed.47  The issuance of 
court decisions takes quite some time, and after a decision is 
delivered to the parties, the decision is inevitably subject to a 
number of expensive and time-consuming appeals.48 
                                                
	
	
46 Código de Comercio [CCo.] [hereinafter “Commercial Code”], art. 
1050, Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], (Dec. 13, 1889) (Mex.) 
(“Cuando conforme a las disposiciones mercantiles, para una de las 
partes que intervienen en un acto, éste tenga naturaleza comercial y para 
la otra tenga naturaleza civil la controversia que del mismo se derive se 
regirá conforme a las leyes mercantiles.”). 
47 This is at least the case in Mexico. OECD Economic Surveys Mexico, 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 22, ¶ 31 
(Jan. 2015), http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Mexico-Overview-
2015.pdf. 
48 In the OECD area, the average length of civil proceedings is around 
240 days in the first instance, but in some countries a trial may require 
almost twice as many days to be resolved (in Mexico: 342 days). Final 
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Arbitration provides a cost-effective option for dispute 
resolution of trust disputes.49 One of the main advantages of 
arbitration is that proceedings take substantially less time 
than litigation.50 This benefit is especially appealing to 
parties involved in trust disputes.  The trust’s goal could be 
completely lost if a dispute were to last for years in 
litigation.51 Arbitral proceedings are put to an end by the 
issuance of an arbitral award, which is final and binding for 
the parties. This feature of the award has a direct impact on 
the time that is invested in the resolution of a dispute simply 
because it is not subject to any appeal mechanisms.52 
Furthermore, arbitral tribunals do not depend on the courts’ 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
disposition of cases may involve a long process of appeal before the 
higher courts, which in some cases can average more than seven years. 
Guiliana Palumbo et al., Judicial performance and its determinants: a cross-
country perspective 38 (OECD Economic Policy Paper No. 5, 2013), 
available at 
http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/FINAL%20Civil%20Justice%20Polic
y%20Paper.pdf.  
49 Gerardo J. Bosques-Hernández, Arbitration Clauses in Trusts: The U.S. 
Developments and a Comparative Perspective, REVISTA PARA EL ANÁLISIS DEL 
DERECHO (INDRET) 6 (2008); Strong, supra note 3, at 1182.  
50 It has been reported that arbitration proceedings in Mexico normally 
last a year, plus the enforcement stage. Claus von Wobeser, Arbitration 
Guide: MEXICO, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION 2 (May 2013), available 
at 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=8A787
6EB-EBB9-4D5F-B073-24618471E911. 
51 Stephen Wills Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and 
Trusts: A Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 627, 635-36 (2011). 
52 ALAN REDFERN ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 34 (5th ed. 2009) (“Although the initial cost is not likely to 
be less than that of proceedings in court, the award of the arbitrators is 
unlikely to be followed by a series of costly appeals to superior local 
courts.”). 
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calendar. Arbitration meetings are easily coordinated, and 
the disputes are resolved considerably faster.53  
Moreover, most litigation in state court follows a very 
formalistic approach in the conduct of the proceedings. This 
results in formalities that are often prioritized over the 
substance of the dispute. Arbitration proceedings are 
tailored to meet the specific requirements of the parties. This 
benefit can be particularly valuable for parties to trust 
disputes. One of the reasons why settlors usually choose a 
trust institution is because of its structural flexibility.54 In 
this regard, parties to trust disputes should in principle 
prefer flexibility in their dispute resolution mechanism as 
well.55 
 
B. INTERPERSONAL BENEFITS: A PERSONALIZED AND 
PRIVATE PROCEDURE 
 
Disputes arising out of trusts can be complex. State 
judges may lack the expertise needed for a dispute of this 
particular kind. Thus, an arbitration panel versed in the 
specificities of modern trust law and practice is advisable. 
Parties can appoint arbitrators that are qualified for the 
dispute at stake, select the rules under which the 
proceedings shall be carried out and determine which law 
will be applicable to the substantive issues of the dispute, 
among other things. If an arbitral tribunal is experienced 
enough, it should be able to grasp the decisive issues of fact 
                                                
	
	
53 Bosques-Hernández, supra note 49, at 6.  
54 Strong, supra note 3, at 1183.  
55 Id. at 1173, 1183. 
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and law in the dispute and adapt the procedure in order to 
ensure that such issues are properly dealt with.56 
Parties to trust disputes will also value the 
personalized and high-end service performed by most 
arbitral tribunals. As opposed to state court judges, 
arbitrators are appointed to handle one specific case from 
the beginning to the end. Accordingly, arbitrators get to 
know the parties and their counsel better than state judges 
do. Most importantly, as the case develops through the 
documents filed by the parties, the pleadings, and the 
gathering of evidence, arbitral tribunals perform a thorough 
analysis of the case and get a proper understanding of it. As 
a result, arbitral tribunals are fully qualified to issue sensible 
awards that will be suitable for the dispute at hand.57 
In addition, arbitration offers a private means of 
resolving legal controversies. This, in principle, makes 
arbitration confidential to the outside world.58 While parties 
to all kinds of contracts appreciate the privacy and 
confidentiality that surrounds arbitral proceedings, parties 
to trusts could particularly value this feature. This holds true 
because, on the one hand, “public forms of dispute 
resolution can damage not only the trustee’s own business 
reputation but also the reputation of the trust industry as a 
whole.”59 On the other hand, settlors and beneficiaries will 
probably appreciate that the dispute is kept private. Settlors 
of both testamentary and commercial trusts often make use 
of trusts precisely because they provide more privacy, 
                                                
	
	
56 REDFERN, supra note 52, at 32. 
57 Id. at 33. 
58 JULIAN D. M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 8 (2003). 
59 Strong, supra note 3, at 1183.  
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discretion, or tax and wealth management optimization than 
other contractual alternatives.60  
Furthermore, privacy will attract parties to 
testamentary trusts because in state courts, issues that may 
be embarrassing to the parties are publically discussed 
during the probate process.61 Likewise, parties to business 
trusts may have an interest in protecting valuable 
information such as trade secrets, ownership of assets, 
credit-lines, competitive practices, or any delicate detail that 
could be subject to adverse publicity.62 
 
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN 
MEXICAN TRUSTS 
 
Arbitration agreements contained in Mexican trusts 
are presumed enforceable in accordance with the New York 
Convention and modern arbitration laws. One of the main 
objectives of the New York Convention and modern 
arbitration laws, including Mexican arbitration law,63 is to 
make arbitration agreements readily enforceable.64 Article 
II(1) of the New York Convention provides that Contracting 
States shall recognize an arbitration agreement made 
                                                
	
	
60 Id. at 1172-73. 
61 Bosques-Hernández, supra note 49, at 6.  
62 REDFERN, supra note 52, at 32.  
63 Mexican arbitration law is found in Articles 1415-1480 of the 
Commercial Code. Its provisions are largely, if not completely, based on 
the original UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration of 1985. Commercial Code, art. 1415-80 (Mex.). 
64 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION 
AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 145, 147 (4th ed. 2013). 
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between parties.65 Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
also provides for the enforcement of arbitration agreements, 
regardless of the arbitral seat.66 The same principle is 
embodied in Article 1424 of the CCo.67 
The presumption of enforceability of an arbitration 
agreement in a Mexican trust deed is the rule and the New 
York Convention and modern arbitration laws limit 
exceptions to this rule. Possible exceptions relate only to 
issues of form validity (e.g. the in-writing requirement), 
substantive validity (the lack of intent or impaired intent), 
non-arbitrability of the subject matter, and lack of legal 
capacity by one of the parties.68 All of these exceptions 
require strong evidence in order to make an arbitration 
agreement unenforceable.69 Accordingly, state courts and 
arbitral tribunals will always enforce an arbitration 
agreement in a Mexican trust by referring the parties to 
arbitration unless one party furnishes evidence that the 
arbitration agreement relied upon is null and void, 
inoperative, or incapable of being performed.70 The above 
                                                
	
	
65 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards art. II(1), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter “N.Y. 
Convention”]. 
66 U.N. Comm'n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Commercial Arbitration, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, U.N. Sales No. 
E.08.V.4 (2008) [hereinafter “UNCITRAL Model Law”]. 
67 Commercial Code, art. 1424 (Mex.). 
68 Commercial Code, arts. 1415, 1423, 1424, 1457, 1462 (Mex.). 
69 INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ICCA'S 
GUIDE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION: A 
HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 45 (2011). 
70 N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. II(3); UNCITRAL Model Law, 
supra note 66, at art. 8(1); Commercial Code, art. 1424; INTERNATIONAL 
COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 69, at 38.  
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may include legal evidence that the subject matter of the 
dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration.71 
The exception of lack of form validity may scarcely 
arise in the context of Mexican trust disputes. Under 
Mexican law, a trust deed shall be made in writing.72 An 
arbitration clause contained therein will therefore also fulfill 
the writing requirement established in Article I(1) of the 
New York Convention and Article 1423 CCo.  
With regard to issues of substantive validity, i.e. 
whether a party’s intent to arbitrate exists and is free of 
mistake, fraud, unconscionability, and duress, etc., these will 
be treated by state courts and arbitral tribunals under the 
applicable general contract provisions.73 The severability 
principle of the arbitration agreement in modern arbitration 
laws74 (Art. 1432 CCo.) will possibly trigger the application 
of a law to the arbitration agreement other than the law 
governing the underlying Mexican trust between the parties. 
Depending on the approach taken at the seat of arbitration, 
i.e. the lex arbitri, the question of which law applies to the 
substantive validity of the arbitration agreement could be 
easy or complex to answer. In arbitrations seated in France, 
case law provides that the existence and effectiveness of an 
arbitration agreement is to be assessed on the basis of the 
                                                
	
	
71 N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(2)(a); Commercial Code, arts. 
1415, 1457 (I)(a) & (II), 1462 (I)(a) & (II).  
72 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 387 (Mex.). 
73 BORN, supra note 64, at 148. 
74 Id. at 146 (“In many nations, including all major trading states, an 
arbitration agreement is presumptively ‘separable’ from the underlying 
contract in which it appears. National arbitration legislation often 
expressly so provides (See UNCITRAL Model Law Article 16; Swiss Law 
on Private International Law Article 178(3); U.S. Federal Arbitration Act 
§2; German Civil Procedure Act Article 1040(1)).”). 
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parties’ common intention alone, with no need to refer to 
any national law.75 Under other arbitration laws, which do 
not contain a conflict of law rule on the applicable law to the 
arbitration agreement per se (i.e. Mexico arbitration law), the 
severability principle can give rise to more complex 
decisions on the law relevant to determining the substantive 
validity of an arbitration agreement contained in a Mexican 
trust deed. A uniform solution to this issue is nevertheless 
found in the New York Convention and in other pro-
enforcement arbitration laws. Article V(1)(a) of the New 
York Convention76 and Article 1462(I)(a) of the CCo.77 both 
                                                
	
	
75 A determination of the law applicable to the arbitration agreements is 
not required under the French law on arbitration, in the absence of an 
express choice of law to govern the arbitration agreements. Municipalité 
de Khoms El Mergeb v. Soc. Dalico, Dec. 20, 1993, Revue de l’Arbitrage, 
KLUWER ARBITRATION (1994), at 117. “By virtue of a substantive rule of 
international arbitration, the arbitration agreement is legally 
independent of the main contract containing or referring to it, and the 
existence and effectiveness of the arbitration agreement are to be 
assessed, subject to mandatory rules of French law and international 
public policy, on the basis of the parties’ common intention, there being 
no need to refer to any national law.” Identifying the governing law of 
the arbitration agreement thus becomes unnecessary. All that matters is 
that the parties consent to refer disputes to arbitration. 
76 N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(a) (“Recognition and 
enforcement of the award may be refused . . . [where] the said agreement 
is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, 
failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the 
award was made.”). 
77 Commercial Code, art. 1462(I)(a), which is modeled after Article 
36(1)(a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra 
note 66, at art. 36(1)(a) (stating that “(1) Recognition or enforcement of an 
arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, may be 
refused only: . . . [where] the said agreement is not valid under the law to 
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, 
under the law of the country where the award was made.”). 
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provide that absent any specific choice of law by the parties 
to that effect, the substantive validity of an arbitration 
agreement is determined by the law of the country where 
the award is made. In other words, by the contract law at the 
place of arbitration.78 In Section V below, we address some 
questions regarding proper formal and substantive intent to 
arbitrate disputes arising out of Mexican trusts. 
The non-arbitrability exception refers to the parties’ 
restriction to submit a dispute to arbitration.79 Virtually all 
countries’ laws exclude certain categories of matters from 
resolution by arbitration.80 Each country has specific policy 
reasons and criteria to remove a class of claims from the 
realm of arbitration.81 A matter that is arbitrable under the 
law of one country may not be capable of resolution by 
arbitration under another country’s law. For example, some 
arbitration laws deem arbitrable only disputes over rights 
the parties are free to dispose of.82 Other more liberal laws 
deem arbitrable all disputes involving claims of a financial 
                                                
	
	
78 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES, art. 31(3) 
(2006) [hereinafter “ICC ARBITRATION RULES”]. 
79 Also called “objective arbitrability,” as opposed to “subjective 
arbitrability,” which concerns whether a party by its own nature is 
restricted to enter into arbitration agreements because of a policy 
consideration to protect that party before State courts. LOUKAS A. 
MISTELIS & STAVROS L. BREKOULAKIS, ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL & 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 6 (2009). 
80 BORN, supra note 64, at 148. 
81 MISTELIS & BREKOULAKIS, supra note 79, at 4 (“Certain disputes may 
involve such sensitive public policy issues that it is felt that they should 
only be dealt with by the judicial authority of state courts. An obvious 
example is criminal law which is generally the domain of the national 
courts: it is undisputed that the sanctioning of criminal activity is in the 
power of the judiciary.”). 
82 CODE JUDICIARE [C.JUD.] art. 1676(1) (Belg.). 
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nature.83 The arbitration laws based on the UNCITRAL 
Model Law do not usually set forth which disputes are 
arbitrable.84 Instead, UNCITRAL-based laws, like the 
Mexican arbitration law, take the approach of defining the 
scope of arbitrability through the exclusion of certain 
matters via statutory provisions that expressly give exclusive 
jurisdiction to specific State courts.85 The determination of 
the law governing the arbitrability of disputes can thus be an 
important strategic question and not an easy one. In practice, 
State courts have relied on the conflict of laws rule in Article 
V(2)(a) of the New York Convention, or its equivalent 
domestic arbitration law,86 in order to apply their own 
national law to determine the arbitrability of the dispute at a 
pre-award (jurisdictional) stage or a post-award stage (in a 
setting aside claim or enforcement claim).87 Arbitral 
tribunals similarly tend to apply the law at the place of 
arbitration in order to determine the arbitrability of the 
subject matter (lex loci arbitri and mandatory rules of law).88 
This trend may be influenced not only by the fact that the 
applicable norms and standards of the seat of arbitration are 
easy to identify, but also by the arbitrators’ natural wish to 
shield their awards against setting aside claims at the place 
of arbitration. In Section VI, we will address the arbitrability 
of disputes arising out of Mexican trusts. 
                                                
	
	
83 LDIP, art. 177(1) (Switz.); ZPO, § 1030, para. 1 (Ger.). 
84 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at art. 1(5) (providing that it 
does not intend to affect other laws of the adopting State that preclude 
certain disputes being submitted to arbitration).  
85 Commercial Code, art. 1415 (Mex.). 
86 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(b)(i), 36(1)(b)(i); 
Commercial Code, arts. 1457(II), 1462(II) (Mex.). 
87 MISTELIS & BREKOULAKIS, supra note 79, at 12, 13. 
88 Id. at 13. 
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The exception for lack of legal capacity of one of the 
parties to the arbitration agreement is equally relevant in the 
context of trust disputes. Article V(1)(a) of the New York 
Convention provides that the recognition and enforcement 
of an award may be denied where the parties to the 
arbitration agreement were, under the law applicable to 
them, under some incapacity.89 However, the New York 
Convention does not define the law governing the issue of 
capacity90 or power91 to enter into an arbitration agreement. 
Under the traditional conflict of laws method, the law 
governing legal capacity is determined differently 
depending on whether it relates to natural persons or legal 
entities. With regard to natural persons, traditional choice of 
law rules of France or Germany would deem applicable the 
law of their nationality.92 On the contrary, some countries’ 
conflict of laws rules, particularly in common law 
jurisdictions, but also in Mexico,93 favor the application of 
the law of the country where the natural person concerned 
has his or her domicile as the connecting factor.94  
With respect to capacity of legal entities, the approach 
is not uniform in domestic laws either. The conflict of laws 
                                                
	
	
89 N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(a). 
90 PHILIPPE FOUCHARD ET AL., FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 242 (1999). 
91 Fouchard et al., correctly point out the confusion regarding capacity 
and power. Capacity relates to the natural or legal person’s legal 
possibility under the law to act on its own name and on its own account. 
Power relates to the legal possibility to act on behalf of and for the 
interest of a legal or natural person. Id.  
92 Id. at 244. 
93 Código Civil Federal [CC] [Federal Civil Code], art. 13(II), Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] (May 14, 1928), últimas reformas DOF 
Dec. 24, 2013 (Mex.). 
94 FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 90, at 244. 
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rules of some jurisdictions, like France, would designate the 
application of the law of the country where the legal entity 
has its headquarters (siege social). Conversely, under other 
legal systems, including Mexico’s,95 the capacity of legal 
entities is assessed in accordance with the law of 
incorporation or registry.96  
The validity and scope of powers of representation 
are governed by different laws. Absent an express choice of 
law by the principal and agent, an agency relationship shall 
be governed by either the law where the authorization was 
granted,97 the law where the principal has its headquarters,98 
or the law where the authorization ought to be performed,99 
depending on the relevant conflict of laws rule applied. 
In both, issues of capacity and power of 
representation, arbitrators face the challenge of deciding 
which conflict of laws rule they will apply. As arbitrators 
have no forum, and thus are not bound by the conflict of 
laws rules of State courts at the seat or any possible place of 
enforcement, arbitrators enjoy flexibility to select the conflict 
of laws rules they deem appropriate. Some scholars see risks 
                                                
	
	
95 Federal Civil Code, art. 2736 (Mex.) (designating the law of 
incorporation to determine the existence, legal capacity, object, and 
functioning of legal entities). 
96 FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 90, at 245. 
97 Inter-American Convention on the Legal Regime of Powers of 
Attorney, (Jan. 16, 1975), 1438 U.N.T.S. 267. 
98 Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency, art. 6, (Mar. 14, 1978), 16 
I.L.M. 775; Code Civil [C. Civ.] [Civil Code] art. 1837(1) (Fr.). 
99  Federal Civil Code, art. 13(V) (Mex.) (however, pursuant to Federal 
Civil Code, art. 13(IV), issues of form validity of a power of 
representation may be determined by the law of the place where the 
power was granted); Código Civil [C.C.] art. 39 (Port.); Código Civil 
[C.C.] art. 21 (Spain); Suprema Corte, [Paraguay Supreme Court] 
18/5/2001, Diego Pizziolo v. Nereo Tiso y Otros, 224. 
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in resorting to the conflict of laws method since, in view of 
the different approaches above described, it is impossible to 
ensure a uniform approach.100 In practice, arbitrators will 
apply either the conflict of laws rule which they are most 
familiar with or the forum judge conflict of laws rules of the 
place of arbitration or enforcement because of the natural 
tendency to render a valid and enforceable award. However, 
as none of these approaches may lead to a uniform and 
satisfactory solution, some scholars, particularly from 
France, have argued for the application of substantive law 
concepts considered essential in an international context 
instead of performing a complicated conflict of laws 
exercise.101 For example, the rule that “any natural person 
carrying on an economic activity on a professional basis is at 
least presumed to have capacity to enter into arbitration 
agreements relating to that activity.”102  In section VII below, 
we will address issues of capacity and representation of 
natural and legal persons usually involved in a Mexican 
trust disputes. 
 
V. CONSENT TO ARBITRATE 
 
As stated above, most countries’ arbitration laws will 
give effect to arbitration proceedings provided there is an 
agreement by the parties to that effect (see Section IV above). 
Therefore, the enforcement of an arbitration agreement over 
one party depends first and foremost, upon the existence of 
that party’s intent, otherwise called ‘consent,’ to arbitrate. In 
most legal systems, agreements or contracts are the product 
                                                
	
	
100 FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 90, at 244, 246. 
101 Id. at 248. 
102 Id. 
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of a process of offers and acceptances.103 For instance, a 
buyer makes an offer to enter into a sales contract whereby it 
undertakes to buy a number of goods for a given price and 
to settle any dispute arising thereof in arbitration. A seller 
accepts the terms of such an offer, creating a contract with 
the buyer. The parties may have achieved a profitable 
bargain out of it. In addition, their arbitration agreement has 
the effect of removing their sales contract from the purview 
of state courts. A state court seized to decide a dispute over 
that sale contract should, in principle, refer the parties to 
arbitration because an arbitration agreement “operates” over 
those parties.104  
In the context of Anglo-American trust law, the issue 
arises as to whether the act of creating a trust, which may 
contain an arbitration provision in the trust deed, is an 
agreement to arbitrate as required by the New York 
Convention and by national arbitration laws.105 The issue is 
of significance because under Anglo-American law, trusts 
are not contracts.106 Indeed, the unilateral transfer of 
property and declaration of trust by the settlor alone creates 
a trust.107 There is no need for an offer and an acceptance for 
a trust to exist.108 Accordingly, the legal relationship 
                                                
	
	
103 INGEBORG SCHWENZER et al., GLOBAL SALES AND CONTRACT LAW 130 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2011). 
104 N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. II(3).  
105 Koch, supra note 3, at 189. 
106 Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory Arbitration 
Provisions: A Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious And Costly Trust 
Litigation, But Are They Enforceable?, 42 A.B.A. REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 
351, 357 (2007); S.I. Strong, Empowering Settlers: How Proper Language Can 
Increase the Enforceability of a Mandatory Arbitration Provision in a Trust, 47 
REAL PROP., TR. AND EST. L. J. 275, 291 (2012). 
107 Koch, supra note 3, at 101. 
108 Strong, supra note 3, at 1174. 
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between the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiaries is not 
strictly contractual in nature.109 In spite of the fact that the 
trustee may be paid for its services or even sign the trust 
deed, the trustee’s fee will arise out of a collateral contract 
that does not form part of the trust.110  
It follows from the above that arbitration provisions 
contained in a trust deed may not constitute an agreement 
between the parties covered by the trust relationship either. 
Indeed, state courts in the United States have considered 
that the unilateral declaration by the settlor per se could 
hardly be construed as an expression of intent by the 
trustees or beneficiaries to arbitrate any disputes arising 
thereof.111 In Schoneberger v. Oelze,112 decided by the Arizona 
Court of Appeals in 2004, the trust contained a provision 
stating that “any dispute arising in connection with this 
Trust, including disputes between Trustee and any 
beneficiary or among the Co-trustees, shall be settled by . . . 
negotiation, mediation and arbitration.”113 When the 
beneficiaries brought claims against the trustees of two 
related family trusts, the latter moved for arbitration on the 
                                                
	
	
109 Koch, supra note 3, at 189. 
110 HUDSON, supra note 36, at 42. 
111 See e.g., Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 612-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2011) (discussing the statutory and case law restrictions to arbitration 
clauses in trusts. “[Appellant] contends the trial court erred by denying 
her motion to compel arbitration under the California Arbitration Act, 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1280 et seq., because the Trust contains 
an arbitration provision and the Trust is a contract. We disagree. The 
applicability of the California Arbitration Act requires the existence of a 
contract.”), as modified on denial of reh'g (June 8, 2011), review granted and 
opinion superseded by Diaz v. Bukey, 257 P.3d 1129 (Cal. 2011) and cause 
transferred by 287 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2012); Murphy, supra note 51, at 639-42. 
112 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). 
113 Id. at 1080. 
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basis of the above-mentioned arbitration agreement.114 In 
response, the beneficiaries contended that the arbitration 
provisions were unenforceable because trusts are not 
contractual agreements and, as non-signatories of the trust 
deeds, they had never agreed to arbitrate their claims against 
the trustees.115 In deciding in favor of the beneficiaries, the 
court explained the nature of Anglo-American trusts in the 
following terms: 
 
The legal distinctions between a trust and a 
contract are at the heart of why [the 
beneficiaries] cannot be required to arbitrate 
their claims against the defendants. 
Arbitration rests on an exchange of promises . . 
. . In contrast, a trust does not rest on an 
exchange of promises. A trust merely requires 
a trustor to transfer a beneficial interest in 
property to a trustee who, under the trust 
instrument, relevant statutes and common law, 
holds that interest for the beneficiary. The 
“undertaking” between trustor and trustee 
“does not stem from the premise of mutual 
assent to an exchange of promises” and “is not 
properly characterized as contractual.”116 
In spite of the above, common law scholars and courts 
have recently advanced different theories in order to 
conclude that arbitration provisions in trust deeds are 
                                                
	
	
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1081. 
116 Id. at 1083 (quoting In re Naarden Trust, 990 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Ariz. App. 
1999)); see also Bruyere & Marino, supra note 106, at 358-60; Bosques-
Hernández, supra note 49, at 16-17. 
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binding agreements between the parties covered by the trust 
relationship.117 In Rachal v. Reitz,118 the Supreme Court of 
Texas reversed an early decision by its court of appeals119 
concluding that an arbitration provision in a trust deed 
could not be enforced under the Texas Arbitration Act 
(TAA) because a binding arbitration provision must be the 
product of an enforceable contract,120 and a contract does not 
exist in the trust context. This is in part because there is no 
consideration and in part because the trust beneficiaries 
have not consented to such a provision.121 The Supreme 
                                                
	
	
117 See e.g., Bruyere & Marino, supra note 106, at 361-62 (submitting that 
the distinction between contracts and trusts no longer makes sense in 
U.S. law. The distinction was due in large part to the works of Austin W. 
Scott, who published an article in the Columbia Law Review in 1917 on the 
inability of contract law to enforce the trust terms because English 
contract law “did not recognize a third-party beneficiary contract, a 
recognition essential to enforcing trust agreements.”). However, this has 
changed in modern U.S. contract law where agreements for the benefit of 
a third party are now enforceable. See Murphy, supra note 51, at 645-61 
(addressing the theoretical shortcoming of the current characterization of 
a trust as something other than a contract; anticipating the “benefit 
theory” that would later on be applied in Rachal v. Reitz by the Supreme 
Court of Texas, which gave effect to an arbitration agreement in a trust 
deed; and addressing the donor’s “Intent Theory” as one of the means to 
enforce arbitration agreements, though admitting that only few 
jurisdictions give unlimited effect to a donor’s intent). See also Bosques-
Hernández, supra note 49, at 8-12. 
118 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013), reh'g denied (Aug. 23, 2013).  
119 Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App. 2011) rev'd, 403 S.W.3d 
840 (Tex. 2013). 
120 Id. 
121 See id.; see also Nancy E. Delaney et al., Rachal v. Reitz and the Evolution 
of the Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in Estate Planning Documents, 27 
PROB. & PROP. 12, 12 (2013) (commenting on the background and Texas 
Supreme Court decision); see also Steven K. Mignogna, Increasing 
Enforceablity of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trust, N.J. L. J. 
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Court of Texas held that the intent of the legislature in the 
Texas Arbitration Act was to enforce arbitration provisions 
in agreements “to arbitrate future disputes” as well as 
formal contracts.122 In Diaz v. Bukey,123 the Supreme Court of 
California instructed the court of appeal to vacate its 
decision to refuse the enforcement of an arbitration 
provision in a trust deed on grounds of lack of a written 
contract and to reconsider the cause in light of Pinnacle 
Museum Tower Ass’n. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), 
LLC.124 In addition, new legislation in some states within the 
United States has been recently enacted addressing this 
issue.125 In fact, the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals 
in Schoneberger v. Oelze126 was superseded by state legislation 
providing that “[a] trust instrument may provide 
mandatory, exclusive and reasonable procedures to resolve 
issues between the trustee and interested persons or among 
interested persons with regard to the administration or 
distribution of the trust.”127 Florida and Hawaii have also 
adopted specific legislation expressly recognizing the 
enforceability of arbitration clauses in trusts.128 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
(2013), available at http://law-articles.vlex.com/vid/enforceability-
clauses-wills-trusts-458312134; Christopher S. Moore, Texas Enforces 
Arbitration Clause in Trust Agreement, 17 ALT. DISP. RESOL. 21, 22 (2013). 
122 Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 844; Mignogna, supra note 121; Delaney et al., 
supra note 121, at 13-14; Moore, supra note 121, at 23 (commenting on the 
Rachal court’s reasoning).   
123 287 P.3d 67, 67 (Cal. 2012). 
124 See generally id. 
125 See e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-10205 (2012). 
126 Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1078. 
127 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-10205. 
128 Bosques-Hernández, supra note 49, at 18; Murphy, supra note 51, at 
665-69. 
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Despite the above doctrines and recent legislation of 
some states endorsing the enforcement of arbitration 
provisions in trust deeds, there is still some jurisprudential 
uncertainty on the issue in many common law 
jurisdictions.129 Proponents of arbitration advise that 
theoretical difficulties can be overcome through careful 
drafting of provisions that create contractual obligations in a 
trust.130 Appropriate wording may read,  
 
[A] settlor on behalf of himself and the 
beneficiaries deriving their interests through 
him, expressly contracts in the trust 
instrument with the trustee . . . that in 
consideration of undertaking the office of 
trustee . . . any breach of trust claim against the 
trustees shall be referred to arbitration.131  
Aware of this issue and the potential of the trusts 
market for arbitration, two important arbitration institutions, 
the ICC Court of Arbitration and the American Arbitration 
Association, propose model arbitration clauses tailor-made 
for trust disputes. The extended text of these clauses 
evidences the fragility of arbitration agreements in trust 
deeds and the need to shield the arbitration proceedings 
                                                
	
	
129 See Murphy, supra note 51, at 639; Delaney et al., supra note 121, at 14-
16. 
130 Koch, supra note 3, at 190; Strong, supra note 106, at 307-09; Tina 
Wüstemann, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 33, 44-45 (Christoph Müller 
ed., 2007); Delaney, et al., supra note 121, at 16. 
131 Strong, supra note 3, at 1179-80 (quoting UNDERHILL & HAYTON:  LAW 
RELATING TO TRUSTS & TRUSTEES ¶ 11.84 (David Hayton et al., eds., 18th 
ed. 2010)). 
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against lack-of-intent challenges and other due process 
issues involving the parties to a trust relationship.132 
                                                
	
	
132 The ICC Clause alone reads:  
 
All disputes arising out of or in connection with the 
trust created hereunder shall be finally settled under 
the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber 
of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed by 
the ICC International Court of Arbitration (the 
‘Court’), in accordance with the said Rules.  
 
The settlor hereby agrees to the provisions of this 
arbitration clause and the trustees, any protector and 
their successors in office, by accepting to act under the 
trust, also agree or shall be deemed to have agreed to 
the provisions of this arbitration clause. Accordingly, 
they all agree to settle all disputes arising out of or in 
connection with the trust in accordance with this 
arbitration clause. 
 
As a condition for claiming, being entitled to or 
receiving any benefit, interest or right under the trust, 
any person shall be bound by the provisions of this 
arbitration clause and shall be deemed to have agreed 
to settle all disputes arising out of or in connection 
with the trust in accordance with this arbitration 
clause.  
 
If, at any time, any person requests to participate in 
arbitral proceedings already pending under the 
present arbitration clause, or if a party to arbitral 
proceedings pending under this arbitration clause 
desires to cause any person to participate in the 
arbitration, the requesting party shall present a 
request for joinder to the Court setting forth the 
reasons for the request. It is hereby agreed that if the 
Court is prima facie satisfied that a basis for joinder 
may exist, any decision as to joinder shall be taken by 
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However, not every jurisdiction experiences this type 
of “collision of bodies of law” or “tale of two cities” 
experience, as described by Strong133 or Koch,134 
respectively, to describe the apparent tension between the 
law of arbitration and the law of trusts in common law 
jurisdictions. Indeed, many jurisdictions, particularly civil 
law countries that have their own domestic version of trusts, 
view this legal institution as contractual in nature.135 As 
mentioned in Section II, the Mexican trust is a contract. In 
this regard, the enforcement of arbitration provisions in 
Mexican trusts shall not encounter the same type of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
the Arbitral Tribunal itself. When taking a decision on 
the joinder, the Arbitral Tribunal shall take into 
account all relevant circumstances, including, but not 
limited to, the provisions of the trust and the stage of 
the proceedings. It is further agreed that the Court 
may reject the request for joinder if it is not so 
satisfied, in which case there shall be no joinder. In 
case of a joinder after the signature or approval of the 
Terms of Reference, an amendment to the same will be 
made either through signature by the parties and the 
Arbitral Tribunal or through approval by the Court, 
pursuant to Article 18 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration. 
It is agreed that in such a case, the Court may take 
whatever measures that it deems appropriate with 
respect to the advance on costs for arbitration. 
 
ICC ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR TRUST DISPUTES, 19 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. 
BULL. 9 (2008), available at http://www.iccdrl.com (search “ICC 
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes” and follow “Commission Report” 
hyperlink). 
133 Strong, supra note 3. 
134 Koch, supra note 3. 
135 Strong, supra note 3, at 1180. 
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challenge. As further addressed below, mutual intent to 
arbitrate will generally exist between the settlor of a Mexican 
trust and the designated trustees pursuant to Mexican 
arbitration law and most other arbitration laws.136 In 
addition, intent to arbitrate will also exist between the 
trustee and non-signatory beneficiaries of a Mexican trust.137 
 
A. INTENT TO ARBITRATE BY SETTLOR AND THE TRUSTEE(S) 
IN A MEXICAN TRUST 
 
Typically, the settlor of a Mexican trust will express 
his intent to transfer specific assets in trust to be held or 
managed by a designated trustee (an authorized financial 
institution in Mexico)138 for clearly identifiable beneficiaries 
pursuant to the terms established by the settlor. These trust 
terms will generally include dispute resolution and 
applicable law provisions. Arbitration may be chosen by the 
settlor as the means to resolve any dispute that may arise out 
of the formation, interpretation, performance, and 
termination of the trust created. In practice, the designated 
trustee will participate in the negotiation and entering into 
of the trust. The trustee’s intent to be bound by the terms of 
the trust will usually be recorded in the trust deed. The first 
question that arises is whether the arbitration provision 
therein could be enforced against the trustee and the settlor 
pursuant to Mexican law.139 The second question is whether 
the same arbitration provision in the same Mexican trust 
                                                
	
	
136 See discussion infra § A.  
137 See discussion id. § B.  
138 See discussion infra § II. B. 
139 See discussion infra § II. A. 1.  
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could (more easily) be enforced against the trustee or the 
settlor in common law systems, (e.g., U.S. or English law).140 
 
1. ENFORCEMENT OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN A 
MEXICAN TRUST PURSUANT TO MEXICAN LAW 
 
Pursuant to Article 1415 of the CCo., the arbitration 
law of Mexico will apply to national and international 
arbitrations when the place of the arbitration is in Mexico.141 
Accordingly, an arbitration clause in a Mexican trust deed 
that selects Mexico as the place of arbitration, or absent such 
selection when the arbitral tribunal so determines (pursuant 
to Article 1436), will be governed by the provisions in 
Articles 1415 et seq. (i.e. by Mexico’s arbitration law).  
With regard to form validity, Article 1423 provides 
that an arbitration agreement shall be “in writing.”142 This 
requirement is met if the arbitration agreement is recorded 
in a document signed by the parties or in an exchange of 
letters, telex, telegrams, faxes, or other means of 
communication, which provide a record of the arbitration 
agreement.143 In addition, the reference in a contract to a 
document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an 
arbitration agreement, provided that the contract is in 
writing and the reference is such as to make that clause part 
of the contract.144 Going back to the typical means to express 
intent by a settlor and a trustee of a Mexican trust, the form 
validity requirement in Article 1423 would be satisfied with 
                                                
	
	
140 See discussion infra § II. A. 2. 
141 Commercial Code, art. 1415 (Mex.). 
142 Commercial Code, art. 1423 (Mex.). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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the settlor’s and trustee’s signing of a trust deed containing 
an arbitration clause. Moreover, the same requirement 
would also be met if—notwithstanding the lack of the 
trustee’s signature on the deed—the trustee’s services 
agreement with the settlor makes reference to the trust deed 
which contains the arbitration clause. Although less typical 
in practice, an arbitration agreement recorded in writing will 
also satisfy the form requirement in Article 1423 if the 
settlor’s or the trustee’s agreement to be bound by the trust 
terms is implied by conduct. An example would be where 
the settlor transfers the assets that are the subject matter of 
the trust to the trustee, pursuant to the terms of an unsigned 
trust deed, or where the trustee begins managing the assets 
transferred by the settlor under the trust terms before a deed 
is signed. As has been held by courts and arbitration 
tribunals applying Article 7 of the UNICTRAL Model Law of 
1985—upon which Article 1423 of the CCo. was modeled—
the intent shall not necessarily be articulated in writing by 
all parties: only a record of the agreement upon which a 
party relies need exist.145 This also means that implied intent 
to be bound by an arbitration agreement will satisfy the in-
writing requirement, irrespective of who may have drafted 
the arbitration agreement at stake. As explained by the Swiss 
Supreme Court in its decision of October 16, 2003, the form 
requirement only applies to the agreement itself, but not to 
the intent by any of the parties. The question of the 
                                                
	
	
145 Schiff Food Products Inc. v. Naber Seed & Grain Co. Ltd. (1996), 149 Sask. 
R. 54 Can. Sask. Q.B.; Achilles (USA) v. Plastics Dura Plastics (1977) 
ltée/Ltd. (2006) QCCA 1523 (Can.). 
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subjective scope of an arbitration agreement is determined 
by means of the classic theory of acceptance of contracts.146 
Following this line of thought, the next step in 
establishing the existence of an agreement between the 
settlor and the trustee in a Mexican trust dispute regards 
issues of substantive validity, i.e. whether the settlor’s or 
trustee’s intention to arbitrate was lawfully exercised and 
given free of abuse or misconceptions, etc. Because Mexico’s 
arbitration law does not cover these matters, the latter shall 
be determined by a different set of law provisions. As 
discussed above, Article V(1)(a) of the New York 
Convention and Article 1462(I)(a) of the CCo.147 uniformly 
                                                
	
	
146 Tribunal fédérale [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 16, 2003, 
4P.115/2003, 129 Arrêts Du Tribunal Fédéral Suisse (Recueil Officiel) 
[ATF] III 727 (Switz.). “However, this formal requirement only applies to 
the arbitration agreement itself, that is to say the agreement (arbitration 
clause) by which the original parties have mutually expressed their joint 
intention to arbitrate. As to the question of the subjective scope of a valid 
arbitration agreement under Art . 178 al. 1 Swiss PILA – this is about 
determining which parties are bound by the agreement or if a third party 
that is not designated nevertheless falls within its scope ratione personae 
– this regards the substance and should therefore be resolved in the light 
of art. 178 al. 2 Swiss PILA.” In the original decision in French, 
“[t]outefois, cette exigence de forme ne s'applique qu'à la convention 
d'arbitrage elle-même, c'est-à-dire à l'accord (clause compromissoire ou 
compromis) par lequel les parties initiales ont manifesté réciproquement 
leur volonté concordante de compromettre. Quant à la question de la 
portée subjective d'une convention d'arbitrage formellement valable au 
regard de l'art. 178 al. 1 LDIP - il s'agit de déterminer quelles sont les 
parties liées par la convention et de rechercher, le cas échéant, si un ou 
des tiers qui n'y sont pas désignés entrent néanmoins dans son champ 
d'application ratione personae -, elle relève du fond et doit, en 
conséquence, être résolue à la lumière de l'art. 178 al. 2 LDIP.”  
147 Commercial Code, art. 1423 (Mex.) (modeled after Art. 36(1)(a) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, which states, “(1) Recognition or enforcement 
of an arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, 
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answer this question designating the law of the country 
where the award is made to be the contract law at the place 
of arbitration (see Section IV above).148 Accordingly, in 
arbitration proceedings in Mexico, either by parties’ choice 
or by the tribunal’s decision (CCo., art. 1436), the provisions 
on obligations and contracts in Mexico’s CCo. and the 
Federal Civil Code (“CC”) will determine the existence of 
the arbitration agreement from a substantive point of view. 
As under most, if not all, laws in the world, Mexico’s 
contract law endorses the principle of freedom of contract, 
whereby agreements may be reached through the parties’ 
express or implied consent (by conduct) to be bound by their 
terms.149 Limits on freedom of contract are nevertheless 
established by provisions on validity where at the 
conclusion of the contract, primary principles protected by 
the law are considered to be at risk. Examples of such 
principles are: (i) the lawfulness of the transaction (illegality, 
immorality, and impossibility which could hardly arise in 
the context of an arbitration agreement); (ii) the free and 
informed will to contract (mistake, unfair terms in adhesion 
contracts, fraud, and duress); and (iii) the bargaining balance 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
may be refused only: (a) at the request of the party against whom it is 
invoked, if that party furnishes to the competent court where recognition 
or enforcement is sought proof that: (i) a party to the arbitration 
agreement referred to in article 7 was under some incapacity; or the said 
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected 
it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where 
the award was made”). 
148 Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the 2012 ICC Rules, “the award shall be 
deemed to be made at the place of the arbitration.” ICC ARBITRATION 
RULES, art. 31(3). 
149 See generally EDGARDO MUÑOZ, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS AND 
SALES IN LATIN-AMERICA, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 94, 103 (Ingeborg 
Schwenzer 6th ed., 2011). 
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of the deal (gross disparity (lesión) situations which rules do 
not apply to business deals in Mexico).150 
It is worth mentioning that under the severability 
principle of arbitration agreements in Article 1432 of the 
CCo., an arbitral tribunal’s decision to void a Mexican trust 
does not entail in itself the annulment of the arbitration 
agreement therein. A party seeking the annulment of an 
arbitration agreement must specifically prove the 
substantive validity grounds in relation to the arbitration 
agreement itself. 
 
2. ENFORCEMENT OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN A 
MEXICAN TRUST PURSUANT TO U.S. OR ENGLISH 
ARBITRATION LAWS 
 
Increasingly, foreign entities and foreign persons are 
parties to a Mexican trust as either settlors or beneficiaries. 
Therefore, it is possible that a settlor and a trustee (or in lieu 
of them, the arbitral tribunal) designate a seat of arbitration 
outside Mexico to resolve any dispute arising out of a 
Mexican trust. The reasons for choosing a place of arbitration 
outside Mexico are many: neutrality, confidentiality, high 
bargaining power of the settlor, origin or place of deposit of 
the assets to be transferred in trust, etc. 
Because the place of arbitration would determine both 
the lex arbitri as well as the law applicable to the substantive 
existence of an arbitration agreement,151 the question is 
                                                
	
	
150 Id. at 169, 209. 
151 That would be the uniform conflict of laws rule to be taken—absent 
an agreement by the parties on the law applicable to the arbitration 
clause—pursuant to Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention as well 
as under the English Arbitration Act 1996, sec. 2(1). 
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whether an arbitration provision in a Mexican trust could be 
enforced against the trustee or the settlor in common law 
systems. Issues of form validity impairing the effect of an 
arbitration agreement in a Mexican trust are unlikely to arise 
in these jurisdictions. Both the English Arbitration Act152 and 
the United States Federal Arbitration Act153 will give effect to 
any arbitration agreement “in writing.” The requirement of 
“in writing” also limits itself to the arbitration provision. It 
does not require consent to be necessarily given by all 
parties in such a manner.154 As mentioned above, the typical 
conclusion of a Mexican trust involves preparing a written 
document outlining the terms pursuant to which the settlor 
conveys the assets to the trustee.155 The settlor and the 
trustee will most likely sign the written deed before the 
trustee becomes the legal depositary or manager of the 
assets on trust. Lack of signature would not empty the 
arbitration agreement of its binding effect over the settlor or 
trustee if their implied acceptance of the trust terms can be 
inferred by conduct. Yet, the question whether the settlor or 
trustee subjectively agreed on the arbitration agreement will 
have to be answered by the contract law provisions at the 
                                                
	
	
152 English Arbitration Act 1996, ch. 23, § 5. 
153 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2 §§ 1-14 (2012).  
154 English Arbitration Act 1996, § 5 provides that “ . . . (2) there is an 
agreement in writing— (c) if the agreement is evidenced in writing or (3) 
Where parties agree otherwise than in writing by reference to terms 
which are in writing, they make an agreement in writing. (4) An 
agreement is evidenced in writing if an agreement made otherwise than 
in writing is recorded by one of the parties, or by a third party, with the 
authority of the parties to the agreement.” 
155 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 387 (Mex.) (“[T]he creation of a trust shall 
always be made in writing.”). 
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place of arbitration, and not by the lex arbitri (since the latter 
does not contain that sort of provisions).156 
In this regard, the issue of characterization of the 
arbitration claims will be key. As previously addressed, 
trusts in Anglo-American jurisdictions derive from the law 
developed by equity courts.157 Accordingly, “with limited 
exceptions, the remedies of trust beneficiaries are equitable 
in character and enforceable against trustees in a court 
exercising equity powers.”158 The remedies or claims within 
a trust are thus not contractual in nature. As the comment to 
§ 197 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959) explains:  
 
A trustee who fails to perform his duties . . . is 
not liable to the beneficiary for breach of 
contract . . . The creation of a trust is conceived 
as a conveyance of the beneficial interest in the 
trust property rather than as a contract . . . 
Further, the trustee by accepting the trust and 
agreeing to perform his duties . . . does not 
                                                
	
	
156 Clausen v. Watlow Electric Mfg. Co., 242 F.Supp. 2d 877, 882 
(D.Or.2002); “The [Federal Arbitration Act] ‘creates a body of federal 
substantive law of arbitrability, enforceable in both state and federal 
courts and pre-empting any state laws or policies to the contrary’ . . . . 
The FAA, however, does not preempt state law regarding the ‘“validity, 
revocability and enforceability of contracts generally.”’ . . . Thus, to 
resolve the issue whether the parties entered into a valid and enforceable 
written agreement to arbitrate, the court must apply general, state-law 
principles of contract interpretation.” Id. at 1049 (citations omitted). 
157 ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 45-47 (Routledge. 8th ed. 
2014). 
158 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 95 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
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make a contract to perform the trust 
enforceable in an action at law.159  
However, the trust created pursuant to Mexican law 
differs from the Anglo-American trust. The Mexican trust is 
a contract (see Section II.B. above). Parties and arbitrators 
should bear in mind that the claims in a Mexican trust are 
contractual ones. More importantly, because a Mexican trust 
is contractual in nature, the traditional process of offer and 
acceptance (or the more modern process of step-by-step 
negotiations) of the trust terms will in principle also lead to 
reaching an agreement on the arbitration clause therein. 
Accordingly, the inclusion of an arbitration agreement in a 
Mexican trust should not give rise to the type of discussions 
currently affecting the enforceability of arbitration 
provisions in Anglo-American trusts (see Section V above). 
Arbitrators in the United States or England apply the 
contract law rules of those jurisdictions to determine the 
substantive existence of the arbitration agreement. 
Arbitrators should not apply the Anglo-American trust rules 
at all in order to establish the nature of a Mexican trust. Any 
issue regarding the Mexican trust (separate from the 
arbitration agreement) including its nature, scope, 
interpretation, and effect should be decided by the law 
pursuant to which such trust was settled, i.e. Mexican law. 
 
B. INTENT TO ARBITRATE BY BENEFICIARIES OR CLASS OF 
BENEFICIARIES IN A MEXICAN TRUST 
 
As mentioned above, the Mexican trust is created 
upon the agreement by the settlor and trustee of the terms of 
                                                
	
	
159 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
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the trust (see Subsection A above).160 Participation of the 
beneficiaries in the execution of the trust agreement is not a 
requirement for the existence of a Mexican trust. Mexican 
law gives effect to trusts that do not designate any 
beneficiary–the latter may be designated subsequent to the 
creation of the trust.161 Accordingly, the question arises as to 
whether an arbitration provision in a Mexican trust binds 
beneficiaries who did not consent to its terms at the time of 
creation.  
State courts and arbitral tribunals have extended 
arbitration agreements to non-signatories using rules or 
theories such as agency, alter ego, implied consent, group of 
companies, estoppel, third-party beneficiary, guarantor, 
subrogation, legal succession and ratification, assumption, 
etc.162 Two legal theories, however, seem to fit well with the 
trust institution and appear to be useful in bridging the 
initial gap between the creation of the trust and the 
subsequent acceptance of the trust terms by beneficiaries. 
The first relies on civil law rules on stipulation pour autrui163 
or provision in favor of a third party. The second is rooted in 
                                                
	
	
160 LGTOC, art. 381 (Mex.). 
161 Id. 
162 See generally Bernard Hanotiau, Consent to Arbitration: Do We Share a 
Common Vision?, 27 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 539, 551 (2011); 
Bernard Hanotiau, Non-signatories in International Arbitration: Lessons from 
Thirty Years of Case Law, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2006: BACK TO 
BASICS? (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2006). 
163 Stipulation pour autrui is a contract or provision in a contract that 
confers a benefit on a third-party beneficiary. A stipulation pour autrui 
gives the third-party beneficiary a cause of action against the promisor 
for specific performance. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW 
(1996). 
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the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel,164 where an 
equal solution can also be reached under the good faith 
principle in civil law systems. 
 
1. THE SETTLOR’S PROVISION IN FAVOR OF A THIRD PARTY 
(CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS) 
 
The legal purpose of the trust is to obtain some 
benefit out of the assets transferred to the trustee. In view of 
this, Mexican law provides that the settlor will designate the 
beneficiaries to receive the benefits that the trust 
encompasses.165 Although beneficiaries are considered 
parties to Mexican trust agreements by most scholars (see 
Section II.B. above), technically beneficiaries only become 
parties to the trust when they decide to exercise the rights 
assigned to them in accordance with the trust terms. In the 
meantime, however, beneficiaries (who did not expressly 
assume the role of parties at the time of the trust’s creation) 
are legally related to the settlor and the trustee as third party 
beneficiaries. 
The contract law doctrine of third party beneficiary 
has its roots in medieval law.166 Pursuant to Article 1121 of 
                                                
	
	
164 Equitable estoppel prevents one party from taking a different position 
at trial than she did at an earlier time if the other party would be harmed 
by the change. 
165 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 382 (Mex.). 
166 Jan Hallebeek, Contracts for a Third-Party Beneficiary: A Brief Sketch from 
the Corpus Iuris to Present-Day Civil Law, 13 FUNDAMINA 11, 14 (2008) (“By 
the end of the Middle Ages both the civilians and the canonists, who 
adopted the Roman alteri stipulari rule, considered it possible for 
contracting parties to stipulate validly that something be given or done 
to a third-party beneficiary and to bring it about that this third party 
could enforce what was stipulated in his favour.”). 
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the French Civil Code, “[a] party may stipulate a benefit for 
a third party as a condition regarding a stipulation that it 
makes for itself or concerning a gift that it makes to another 
party.”167 The rule is an exception to the principle of privity 
of contracts.168 Article 1165 of the French Civil Code 
recognizes the exception, stating: “[a]greements produce 
effects only between the contracting parties; agreements do 
not affect and benefit third parties except as provided in 
article 1121 [provision in favor of a third party].”169 
Beneficiaries of a trust deed are potentially affected by and 
benefit from the terms of the trust as if they were under the 
doctrine of stipulation pour autrui. It is just a matter of time 
before the beneficiaries’ become fully bound by the trust 
terms, including any dispute resolution clause. 
Mexico’s Federal Civil Code (CC) embodies the same 
provisions.170 Article 1870 of the CC provides further that 
“the rights of the designated third party arise at the time of 
the contract conclusion, unless the contracting parties retain 
the power to impose conditions expressly established in 
the agreement as they consider appropriate” (emphasis 
                                                
	
	
167 The original reads, “On peut pareillement stipuler au profit d'un tiers 
lorsque telle est la condition d'une stipulation que l'on fait pour soi-
même ou d'une donation que l'on fait à un autre. Celui qui a fait cette 
stipulation ne peut plus la révoquer si le tiers a déclaré vouloir en 
profiter.” Code Civil [C. Civ.] [Civil Code] art. 1121 (Fr.). 
168 The doctrine of privity in the common law of contract provides that a 
contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations arising under it on 
any person or agent except the parties to that contract. 
169 The original reads, “Les conventions n'ont d'effet qu'entre les parties 
contractantes ; elles ne nuisent point au tiers, et elles ne lui profitent que 
dans le cas prévu par l'article 1121.” Code Civil [C. Civ.] [Civil Code] art. 
1165 (Fr.). 
170 Federal Civil Code, arts. 1869-1872 (Mex.).   
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added).171 In this regard, arbitration specialists in Mexico 
submit that even if this doctrine arguably does not impose 
obligations but grants benefits to third parties,172 Article 1870 
validates the view that parties are free to attach to the 
benefits stipulated in favor of a third party collateral clauses 
which form part of the whole transaction.173  
Against this background, an arbitration provision in a 
trust deed will not only cover disputes between the trustee 
(promisor) and the settlor (promisee), but also those disputes 
regarding the stipulation itself (the benefits). In light of the 
fact that the benefits of a trust concern the beneficiary, the 
arbitration clause binds the beneficiary as part of the 
transaction designed by the original parties. 
That being said, beneficiaries must show their intent 
to be bound by the arbitration provision in the trust deed. As 
                                                
	
	
171 The original reads: “El derecho de tercero nace en el momento de 
perfeccionarse el contrato, salvo la facultad que los contratantes 
conservan de imponerle las modalidades que juzgue convenientes, 
siempre que éstas consten expresamente en el referido contrato.” Federal 
Civil Code, art. 1870 (Mex.).   
172 The discussion arose out of Francisco Gonzalez de Cossio’s first 
proposal to see an arbitration agreement as an obligation of the type of a 
condition precedent to be fulfilled by the third party in order to obtain 
the benefits stipulated in its favor. Francisco Gonzalez-de-Cossio, El Que 
Toma el Botín, Toma La Carga: La Solución a Problemas Relacionados con 
Terceros en Actos Jurídicos que Contiene un Acuerdo Arbitral e Involucra 
Terceros, 14-16 (2012) [hereinafter “Gonzalez-de-Cossio – 2012”]. 
However, in the two further essays referenced below González de Cossio 
seems to concede that historically, the third parties could not be 
burdened with obligations but rather only afforded rights, prompting 
the author to revisit the nature of an arbitration agreement in that case. 
Francisco Gonzalez-de-Cossio, El Que Toma el Botín, Toma la Carga: La 
Idea Gana Adeptos, 5-8 (2013) [hereinafter “Gonzalez-de-Cossio – 2013”]. 
173 Gonzalez-de-Cossio – 2013, supra note 172, at 6-8; see also González-de-
Cossio – 2012, supra note 172, at 1-3. 
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addressed above (see Section V.A.1. above), the “in writing” 
requirement in Article 1423 of the Commercial Code shall 
not be an issue. Mexican trusts must also be created in 
writing.174 Therefore, written evidence of the arbitration 
agreement will be contained in the trust deed. Pursuant to 
Article 1423, the beneficiaries’ intent need not necessarily be 
articulated in writing.175 Beneficiaries’ implied intent to be 
bound by an arbitration agreement satisfies the in-writing 
requirement. The question of whether conduct shows intent 
is determined by means of the classic theory of contract 
formation and interpretation.176 
                                                
	
	
174 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 387 (Mex.). 
175 Schiff Food Products Inc. v. Naber Seed & Grain Co. Ltd, [1996] 149 Sask. 
R. 54 (Can. Que.); Achilles (USA) v. Plastics Dura Plastics, [1977] 2006 
CCQA 1523 (Can. Que.). 
176 Tribunal federal [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 16, 2003, 129 III 
727, ARRÊTS DU TRIBUNAL FÉDÉRAL SUISSE (ATF) (Switz) (“However, this 
formal requirement only applies to the arbitration agreement itself, that 
is to say the agreement (arbitration clause) by which the original parties 
have mutually expressed their joint intention to arbitrate. As to the 
question of the subjective scope of a valid arbitration agreement under 
Art . 178 al. 1 Swiss PILA- this is about determining which parties are 
bound by the agreement or if a third party that is not designated 
nevertheless falls within its scope ratione personae – this regards the 
substance and should therefore be resolved in the light of art. 178 al. 2 
Swiss PILA.”). In the original decision in French, “[t]outefois, cette 
exigence de forme ne s'applique qu'à la convention d'arbitrage elle-
même, c'est-à-dire à l'accord (clause compromissoire ou compromis) par 
lequel les parties initiales ont manifesté réciproquement leur volonté 
concordante de compromettre. Quant à la question de la portée 
subjective d'une convention d'arbitrage formellement valable au regard 
de l'art. 178 al. 1 LDIP - il s'agit de déterminer quelles sont les parties 
liées par la convention et de rechercher, le cas échéant, si un ou des tiers 
qui n'y sont pas désignés entrent néanmoins dans son champ 
d'application ratione personae -, elle relève du fond et doit, en 
conséquence, être résolue à la lumière de l'art. 178 al. 2 LDIP.” 
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As an authority on Mexican arbitration submits, there 
may not be a clear way to show intent to be bound by an 
arbitration agreement than a beneficiary’s will to exercise a 
right conferred by the contract that comprises an arbitration 
agreement.177 Although not originally a party to such 
contract, accepting to profit out of the rights therein shall 
amount to that party’s acceptance of the whole combo, 
including the arbitration provision.178 
The same result has been achieved under similar 
common law doctrines. Pursuant to the doctrine of “deemed 
acquiescence,” beneficiaries who receive some type of 
benefit under the trust are deemed bound by the terms of 
the trust, including any arbitration clause therein.179 The rule 
has been drawn in part from the language found in section 
82(2) of the English Arbitration Act, reading “a party to an 
arbitration agreement includes any person claiming under or 
through a party to the agreement.” In that order of ideas, 
any beneficiary who draws his interest in the trust from the 
settlor and whose rights and obligations are determined by 
the trust deed is considered to have consented to the 
arbitration agreement.180 As put by some scholars, the 
doctrine lies on the premise that “by accepting the settlor’s 
bounty the beneficiary is deemed to have also accepted the 
conditions under which the settlor is willing to have the 
beneficiaries profit from his/her bounty, which includes the 
agreement to arbitrate.”181 
                                                
	
	
177 Gonzalez-de-Cossio – 2013, supra note 172, at 9. 
178 Id. at 9-10. 
179 Strong, supra note 3, at 1211. 
180 Id. 
181 Koch, supra note 3, at 190.  
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Should a settlor wish to avoid the interpretive task of 
proving consent by any designated beneficiaries, she may 
consider drafting a trust deed in a way that deems 
benefitting from the trust terms as an implied agreement to 
submit disputes to arbitration.182 The ICC Court of 
Arbitration suggests the following wording in its model 
trusts dispute clause: 
 
As a condition for claiming, being entitled to 
or receiving any benefit, interest or right under 
the trust, any person shall be bound by the 
provisions of this arbitration clause and shall 
be deemed to have agreed to settle all disputes 
arising out of or in connection with the trust in 
accordance with this arbitration clause.183 
2. DOCTRINE OF DIRECT BENEFITS ESTOPPEL (U.S. LAW) OR 
GOOD FAITH (CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS) 
 
Courts in the U.S. have recently applied a different 
(though overlapping) theory to attract non-signatory 
beneficiaries to arbitration proceedings.184 Pursuant to the 
doctrine of “direct benefits estoppel” a party may be 
estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature on a 
written contract precludes enforcement of the contract's 
                                                
	
	
182 Strong, supra note 3, at 1210. 
183 See ICC ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR TRUST DISPUTES, 19 ICC INT’L CT. OF 
ARB. BULL. 9 (2008), available at http://www.iccdrl.com (search "ICC 
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes" and follow link for "ICC 
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes"). 
184 Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex. 2013); ENGlobal U.S., Inc. v. 
Gatlin, 449 S.W.3d 269, 274 (Tex. App. 2014); Greenberg Traurig, LLP v. 
National American Ins. Co., 448 S.W.3d 115, 122 (Tex. App. 2014). 
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arbitration clause where that party has consistently 
maintained that other provisions of the same contract should 
be enforced to benefit him.185 This theory has its roots in the 
rule that a third party enjoying direct benefits or exercising 
rights like a party under a contract may not challenge the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal.186 The rule dates back to 
Tepper Realty Co. v. Mosaic Tile Co., where a District court 
found that the “(claimant) cannot have it both ways. It 
cannot rely on the contract when it works to its advantage 
and ignore it when it works to its disadvantage.”187 
More recently, in Rachal v. Reitz the Supreme Court of 
Texas considered this rule in the context of a lawsuit in 
damages for breach of the trust terms and fiduciary duties 
brought by a beneficiary against the trustee.188 In this case, 
the beneficiary claimed that the trustee had inappropriately 
taken money from the trust estate and thus that the 
beneficiary was “entitled to any profits that would accrue to 
the trust estate if there had been no breach of trust.”189 The 
beneficiary, however, argued that the arbitration provision 
contained in the trust deed was invalid as to him for lack of 
mutual assent. The court disagreed, holding that: 
 
A beneficiary who attempts to enforce rights 
that would not exist without the trust manifests 
her assent to the trust's arbitration clause. For 
                                                
	
	
185 Id. 
186 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1473 § 1 
(KLUWER L. INT’L. 2014); Janin Blaine-Covington, The Validity of 
Arbitration Provisions in Trust Instruments, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 525, 528 
(1967). 
187 259 F.Supp. 688, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
188 403 S.W.3d at 847. 
189 Id, 
52 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
example, a beneficiary who brings a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty seeks to hold the 
trustee to her obligations under the instrument 
and thus has acquiesced to its other provisions, 
including its arbitration clause. In such 
circumstances, it would be incongruent to 
allow a beneficiary to hold a trustee to the 
terms of the trust but not hold the beneficiary 
to those same terms.190 
The same solution should be achieved under the 
principle of good faith in many jurisdictions. Article 2.A.1 of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that “in the 
interpretation of this Law, regard is to be had to its 
international origin and to the need to promote uniformity 
in its application and the observance of good faith” 
(emphasis added). Notwithstanding the fact that the 
beneficiary’s intent to be bound by the arbitration agreement 
must be assessed under the contract law provisions at the 
place of arbitration (and not by the lex arbitri, see Section 
V.A.1. above), article 2.A.1 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
2006 sheds light on the importance of applying the good 
faith principle in arbitration matters.191 Relying on the 
contract principles of reliance and good faith, the Swiss 
Supreme Court in a decision dated April 7, 2014, found that 
a non-signatory parent company of the respondent, by 
virtue of its statements and behavior, had given the 
appearance that it was a party to the contract. The claimant 
could therefore believe, in good faith, that the parent 
                                                
	
	
190 Id. 
191 See generally Bernardo Cremades, Good Faith in International Arbitration, 
27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.761, 779 (2012). 
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company was bound by the contracts’ terms, including the 
arbitration agreements.192  
Although we must still wait to see how State courts 
and arbitral tribunals will apply the good faith principle in 
the context of trust disputes, there are grounds to conclude 
that beneficiaries who maintain an undergoing relationship 
with trustees under the umbrella of a trust deed that 
includes an arbitration agreement could eventually be 
covered by the agreement. The good faith principle works as 
an interpretive tool to evaluate a non-signatory beneficiary’s 
statements or conduct. If the non-signatory beneficiary’s 
conduct or statements are such as to lead the trustees to 
reasonably believe that the beneficiary agrees to the terms of 
the trust as a whole, the beneficiary shall be deemed covered 
by the arbitration agreement. 
 
VI. ARBITRABILITY OF MEXICAN TRUST DISPUTES IN MEXICO 
 
As introduced in Section IV, the enforceability of an 
arbitration agreement will also depend upon whether the 
claims in dispute are arbitrable.193 We share the majority 
view within arbitration law and practice that this question is 
to be determined by the lex arbitri and mandatory provisions 
at the place of arbitration, as discussed in Section IV.194 For 
the purposes of this article, we will review whether disputes 
arising out of a Mexican trust are arbitrable pursuant to 
                                                
	
	
192 Tribunal federal [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Apr. 7, 2014, 
4A_450/2013, KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Switz). 
193 BORN, supra note 64, at 148; see also MISTELIS & BREKOULAKIS, supra 
note 79, at 4. 
194 N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(2)(a); UNCITRAL MODEL 
LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(b)(i), 36(1)(b)(i); Commercial Code, arts. 
1457(II), 1462(II) (Mex.); MISTELIS & BREKOULAKIS, supra note 79, at 12-13.  
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Mexican law. In practice, this would make sense. On the one 
hand, settlors and trustees of Mexican trusts will most likely 
choose Mexico as a place of arbitration. As previously stated 
in Section II.B., under Mexican trust law, only authorized 
and registered financial and credit institutions, which are 
mainly banks in Mexico, may act as trustees. One could 
predict that financial institutions proposing or accepting an 
arbitration agreement in a Mexican trust deed will want to 
keep the arbitration proceedings under the supervision of 
Mexican courts and Mexican mandatory rules of law.195 In 
this case, a determination of the arbitrability of Mexican 
trusts-related claims would be relevant at the jurisdictional 
stage196 or in the case of annulment actions, against the 
award.197  
On the other hand, in the event parties select a place 
of arbitration outside Mexico, or where the arbitral tribunal 
so determines,198 the arbitrability rule pursuant to Mexican 
law will most likely be relevant at the stage of enforcement 
of the arbitration award.199 Since only Mexican-authorized 
financial and credit institutions may act as trustees, any 
arbitral award that is not voluntarily complied with by the 
trustees will have to be enforced in Mexico. In this regard, all 
parties involved in a Mexican trust arbitration have a 
                                                
	
	
195 See infra Section IX. 
196 This is when a review of the arbitrability concept needs to be made by 
the arbitral tribunal pursuant to Art. 1434 CCo. Mexico or by Mexican 
State courts in accordance with Art. 1424 CCo. Mexico. Commercial 
Code, arts. 1424, 1434 (Mex.). 
197 See id. at arts. 1457(II), 1462(II); MISTELIS & BREKOULAKIS, supra note 79, 
at 12-13.  
198 Commercial Code, art. 1436 (Mex.). 
199 Where Art. V(2)(a) of the New York Convention becomes relevant. See 
N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(2)(a). 
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legitimate interest in knowing whether the scope of 
arbitrability under Mexican law could jeopardize the 
enforcement of an arbitration award in Mexico. 
Lack of arbitrability is a jurisdictional matter. As such, 
the arbitral tribunal will determine the arbitrability of trust 
disputes under Mexican law. Pursuant to Article 1424 of the 
CCo., state courts will only deny effect to an arbitration 
agreement where the claim at stake is evidently non-
arbitrable upon a summary examination.200 That said, State 
courts will have the final decision regarding the arbitrability 
of a dispute if asked to intervene in an annulment or 
enforcement action pursuant to Articles 1457 (II) and 1462 
(II) of the CCo.201 
Mexico has a unitary or “monist” arbitration law. A 
single set of provisions, Articles 1415-1480 of the CCo., 
govern both domestic and international arbitration 
proceedings.202 In contrast to other jurisdictions,203 Mexican 
                                                
	
	
200 Commercial Code, art. 1424 (Mex.). 
201 Commercial Code, arts. 1457(II), 1462(II) (Mex.). 
202 Compare Commercial Code, art. 1415 (Mex.) with Commercial Code, 
arts. 1461-63 (The Commercial Code will apply to enforcement of 
international awards when the seat is outside of Mexico in a country 
which has not ratified the New York Convention).  
203 See Xavier Favre-Bulle & Edgardo Muñoz, Monismo y dualismo de las 
leyes de arbitraje: ¿Son Todas Ellas Dualistas?, ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONAL, 
PASADO, PRESENTE Y FUTURO 1449 (Carlos Soto & Delia Marsano ed., 
2013) (The French and the Swiss arbitration laws are dual. A different set 
of provisions governs international and domestic arbitration 
proceedings. Actually, the notion of arbitrability is defined differently 
depending on the international or the domestic nature of the 
proceedings.); compare Loi fedérale sur le droit international privé [LDIP] 
[Federal Statute on Private International Law] (Dec. 18, 1987), RS 291, art. 
177(1) (Switz.) (applicable to international arbitration with a broad 
notion of arbitrability), with Code de procedure civile [CPC] [Code of 
Civil Procedure] (Dec. 19, 2008), RS 272, art. 354 (Switz.) (applicable to 
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law provides a single notion of arbitrability that applies to 
both domestic and international arbitrations.204 The notion of 
arbitrability has its starting point in Article 1415 CCo.205 
Pursuant to this article, all matters are subject to arbitration 
unless other laws stipulate the contrary (A) or provide for 
special procedures (B).206 In addition, it is generally 
understood that disputes over rights that a person may not 
freely dispose of are not arbitrable either (C).207 
 
A. PROVISIONS STIPULATING THAT CERTAIN DISPUTES ARE 
NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO BE SOLVED BY ARBITRATION 
 
CCo. Articles 2946-2951 lists the matters that shall not 
be resolved by settlement between parties in dispute.208 
Arbitration specialists in Mexico maintain that those same 
matters are also understood as excluded from the realm of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
domestic arbitrations with a narrow notion of arbitrability); Décret 75-
1123 du 5 décembre 1975 Instituant Un Noveau Code De Procedure 
Civile [Law 75-1123 of Dec. 5, 2008 Establishing a New Civil Procedure 
Code], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], (Dec. 9, 1975), 12521 (provisions of the French Code 
of Civil Procedure applicable to domestic and international arbitrations). 
204 Commercial Code, art. 1416(III) (Mex.) (stating that proceedings are 
international where (a) parties have their place of businesses in different 
countries or the main obligation is to be performed abroad or (b) the 
place of arbitration is outside of Mexico). 
205 Commercial Code, art. 1415 (Mex.). 
206 Id. (stating that Mexican arbitration law applies “unless . . . other acts 
provide for a different procedure or that certain disputes are not 
arbitrable”). 
207 FRANCISCO GONZALEZ-DE-COSSIO, ARBITRAJE 199 (Porrúa 3rd ed. 2011). 
208 Federal Civil Code, art. 2944 (Mex.) (pursuant to Mexican law, a 
“settlement” (transacción) is defined as “an agreement by which parties 
put an end to any present or future dispute”). 
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arbitration.209 The list includes disputes over incapacitated 
persons’ or minors’ rights, except where settlement is in 
their interest with prior judicial authorization,210 tort liability 
arising from crimes,211 the legal status of people and the 
validity of marital agreements,212 future claims based on 
crime, fraud or intentional harm,213 the right to alimony,214 
future inheritance rights,215 and inheritance rights before a 
last testament or will is disclosed.216 Article 615 of Mexico 
City’s Civil Code provides that the same matters are non-
arbitrable.217 
In the context of a family trust dispute, the issue may 
arise as to whether a claim brought by a tutor or parent on 
behalf of a minor or incapacitated beneficiary against the 
trustee or settlor may be barred from being decided in 
arbitration pursuant to Article 2946 of the CC. We submit 
that the purpose of Article 2946 is to afford state court 
protection to minors or incapacitated persons in cases where 
the claim derives out of rights intrinsic to their personal and 
family status. For example, rights over alimony calculation, 
inheritance, (but not wills), social benefits, etc. However, 
rights that beneficiaries are entitled to pursuant to the terms 
of a trust have a different nature. These rights arise out of 
                                                
	
	
209 GONZALEZ-DE-COSSIO, supra note 207, at 201. 
210 Federal Civil Code, art. 2946 (Mex.).  
211 Id. at art. 2947. 
212 Id. at art. 2948. 
213 Id. at art. 2950(I), (II). 
214 Id. at art. 2950(V); see id. at art. 2949 (for a determination of the amount 
of alimony that may be arbitrable). 
215 Id. at art. 2950(III). 
216 Id. at art. 2950 (IV). 
217 See Código Civil para el Distrito Federal [CCDF] [Mexico City Civil 
Code], art. 615, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] (Aug. 31, 1928) 
(Mex.). 
58 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
the settlor’s wish (not from any legal obligation) to distribute 
gifts and wealth among his/her descendants through the 
trustees in accordance with the trust terms. The nature of 
those rights is purely contractual. Accordingly, no court 
authorization should be necessary to make a minor’s or 
incapacitated person’s claim arbitrable in such a case. As an 
exemption, proper authorization shall be required if the 
minor’s or incapacitated person’s claim is based on the 
settlor’s legal obligation to provide legal alimony or 
allowance to the minor or to the incapacitated concerned. In 
such a case, the claim would not even be arbitrable pursuant 
to Article 2950(V).218 The rest of the matters covered by 
Articles 2946-2951 do not pertain to trusts. 
It is worth noting that Panama and Paraguay trusts 
laws specifically recognize the arbitrability of trust 
disputes.219 Spanish, Bolivian, and Peruvian laws take the 
same approach regarding testamentary disputes.220 
Historically rooted in the Spanish civil law tradition, these 
jurisdictions share similar values of morals and justice with 
Mexico. Notwithstanding the fact that no specific provision 
in the Mexican trust law (LGTOC) is needed to submit trust 
disputes to arbitration, providing for this in the statute 
would certainly clear any doubts and avoid this type of 
analysis. Arbitration of trust disputes in Panama is 
                                                
	
	
218  Federal Civil Code, at art. 2950(V); see id. at art. 2949 (addressing the 
amount of alimony that may be arbitrable). 
219 Bosques-Hernández, supra note 49, at 23-24 (discussing Art. 41 Ley 1 
de 1984, 5 de enero (Panamá) and Ley 921, Negocios fiduciaries 
(Paraguay)). 
220 Id. 
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becoming more popular every day, making this jurisdiction 
even more attractive to international settlors.221 
 
B. MATTERS OF THE EXCLUSIVE PURVIEW OF MEXICAN 
COURTS 
 
Pursuant to Article 568 of Mexico’s Federal Code of 
Civil Procedure (“Mexico CFPC”), Mexican courts will have 
exclusive jurisdiction to decide claims over matters of land 
and water resources located within national territory, 
resources of the exclusive economic zone or resources 
related to any of the sovereign rights regarding such zone, 
acts of authority or acts related to the internal regime of the 
State and of the federal entities, the internal regime of 
Mexican embassies and consulates abroad, and their official 
proceedings.222 
Claims arising out of private Mexican trusts223 are 
unlikely to fall in any of the above categories. The scope of 
Article 568(I) Mexico CFPC covers land or water of public 
ownership only.224 Therefore, claims arising out of Mexican 
trusts which assets in trust consist of non-government lands 
or immovable goods are arbitrable.  On the other hand, 
disputes arising out of so called trusts over immovable 
                                                
	
	
221 GRANT JONES & PETER PEXTON, ADR AND TRUSTS: AN INTERNATIONAL 
GUIDE TO ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION OF TRUST DISPUTES 340 (2015). 
222 Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles [CFPC] [Federal Civil 
Procedure Code], art. 568, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] (Feb. 24, 
1928), últimas reformas Jan. 28, 2010 (Mex.). 
223 Public trusts, i.e. those involving the Mexican government as one of 
the parties and regulated by administrative law are not covered by this 
work.  
224 Federal Civil Procedure Code, arts. 568(I) (Mex.). 
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goods located in the Mexican Restricted Zone225 are not 
affected either. Arbitrators may not disregard the mandatory 
provisions in Article 27(I) of the Mexico Constitution and 
Title II of the Mexico Foreign Investment Law.226 In this line 
of thought, arbitrators shall apply the ownership restrictions 
regarding the real estate transferred in trust. However, this 
does not mean that the beneficiaries’ right of using and 
developing the land transferred in trust by the settlor are 
affected by the non-arbitrability exception. Consequently, 
the rights and obligations arising out of that type of trust 
agreement are also arbitrable under Mexican law. 
Provisions in Mexican law227 that merely define the 
territorial jurisdiction among Mexican courts do not 
constitute a restriction to arbitration. For example, Article 
391 of the LGTOC prohibits trustees from renouncing or 
being exempted from performing the trust terms but for 
justifiable grounds according to the First Instance Court of 
the trustee’s domicile.228 Furthermore, Article 393 provides 
                                                
	
	
225 In Spanish: “Fideicomisos sobre Inmuebles localizados en la zona 
restringida.” 
226 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CP] [Political 
Constitution of the United Mexican States], Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO] (Feb. 5, 1917), últimas reformás DOF Feb. 10, 2014 
(Mex.) (barring aliens from acquiring direct ownership of lands and 
waters within a hundred kilometers along the country boarders and 
within fifty kilometers of the seacoast); Ley de Inversíon Extranjera 
[LIEX] [Mexican Foreign Investment Law], tit. II, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO] (Dec. 27, 1993), últimas reformás Apr. 9, 2012 (Mex.) 
(stating that aliens are only allowed the use and develop real estate 
located within this restricted zone, through the creation of a trust). 
227 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 381 (Mex.). 
228 The authors’ translation. The original in Spanish reads: “La institución 
fiduciaria tendrá todos los derechos y acciones que se requieran para el 
cumplimiento del fideicomiso, salvo las normas o limitaciones que se 
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that the First Instance Court of the trustee’s domicile will 
also decide the effects of the termination of a trust 
agreement, i.e. whether the settlor or the beneficiaries may 
receive the remaining assets held in trust by the trustee.229 
As stated, these provisions do not give exclusive jurisdiction 
to Mexican courts in those matters. Similar provisions are 
often found in other civil and commercial law statutes and 
have not raised any arbitrability problems in practice.230 
Ultimately, their goal is to predict which of the many courts 
in Mexico will have jurisdiction, unless otherwise agreed to 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
establezcan al efecto, al constituirse el mismo; estará obligada a cumplir 
dicho fideicomiso conforme al acto constitutivo; no podrá excusarse o 
renunciar su encargo sino por causas graves a juicio de un Juez de 
Primera Instancia del lugar de su domicilio, y deberá obrar siempre 
como buen padre de familia, siendo responsable de las pérdidas o 
menoscabos que los bienes sufran por su culpa.” 
229 The authors’ translation. The original in Spanish reads: “Extinguido el 
fideicomiso, si no se pactó lo contrario, los bienes o derechos en poder de 
la institución fiduciaria serán transmitidos al fideicomitente o al 
fideicomisario, según corresponda. En caso de duda u oposición respecto 
de dicha transmisión, el juez de primera instancia competente en el lugar 
del domicilio de la institución fiduciaria, oyendo a las partes, resolverá lo 
conducente.” 
230 Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles [LGSM] [General Law for 
Commercial Corporations, arts. 185, 202, Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DO] (Aug. 4, 1934), últimas reformás June 13, 2014 (Mex.) (providing for 
the intervention of State judges in disputes arising between shareholders 
or out of the internal organization of the company. However, these same 
disputes are, as a matter of law, susceptible to be solved by arbitration); 
Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Arbitrability of (Intra-) Corporate Disputes, 
ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 288 
(Loukas A. Mistelis & Stravos L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009) (“In modern 
arbitration practice and law, first, it is considered that the fact that the 
law refers to Court as competent to hear a certain dispute does not 
necessarily exclude arbitration.”). 
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by the parties in the form of a forum selection clause231 or 
arbitration agreement.232 
 
C. DISPUTES OVER RIGHTS THAT A PERSON MAY NOT 
DISPOSE OF 
 
Pursuant to Article 6o of the Mexico CC, people may 
waive their private rights when doing so does not affect 
directly the public order or third parties’ rights.233 This 
principle is the basis of other provisions in Mexican law that 
expressly invalidate settlement agreements with regard to 
claims on rights that parties may not freely dispose of such 
                                                
	
	
231 Federal Civil Procedure Code, arts. 566, 567 (Mex.) (stating that forum 
selection clauses are enforceable in Mexico, unless the selection amounts 
to denial of justice or operates only for the benefit of one of the parties 
and not for all of them). 
232 Cf. Viscasillas, supra note 230, at 288, 289 (“[Brussels Regulation] Art. 
22(2) provides for exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of the seat in 
regards to proceedings which have as their object the validity of the 
constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal 
persons or associations of natural or legal persons, or of the validity of 
the decisions of their organs. [However], apart from the fact that the 
Brussels Regulation excludes arbitration from its scope of application, it 
establishes the exclusive competence of a national Court in relation to 
other national Courts within EU, but not in relation to arbitration. 
Arbitral Tribunals are not within the body of national courts and thus it 
is wrong to equate the former with the latter.”). 
233 The authors’ translation. The original in Spanish reads: “La voluntad 
de los particulares no puede eximir de la observancia de la ley, ni 
alterarla o modificarla. Sólo pueden renunciarse los derechos privados 
que no afecten directamente al interés público, cuando la renuncia no 
perjudique derechos de tercero.” Federal Civil Code, art. 6o (Mex.). 
2015 ARBITRATION OF MEXICAN TRUST DISPUTES 63 
as divorce,234 right to alimony, validity of marriage, criminal 
matters, etc. (see Section A). Accordingly, rights traditionally 
considered as inalienable by private parties will also be 
excluded from the realm of arbitration, despite no express 
lack of arbitrability stipulated as a matter of law. These 
rights may include matters such as parental custody, 
adoption, political rights, employment disputes over 
salaries, leave and pensions, tax disputes against the state, 
the absolute right to inheritance by minors, widows etc., 
despite any testament or will stipulation to the contrary, and 
anti-trust disputes.235 
Since freedom to dispose of one’s rights means the 
possibility to waive such rights, in the context of trusts, the 
question is whether beneficiaries can waive the rights 
granted by the settlor under the trust terms.236 As it turns 
out, beneficiaries can reject any benefits they are entitled to 
receive under a trust. Once again, such rights usually result 
from settlor’s wish (rather than from any legal obligation) to 
distribute wealth among the beneficiaries.  Accordingly, 
claims arising out of the interpretation and performance of 
the trust terms, in principle, relate to rights one can freely 
dispose of and thus are arbitrable. Should a specific claim 
concern rights one may not freely dispose of, modern 
arbitration law and practice will require arbitral tribunals 
and state courts to only disallow the specific claim while 
allowing the rest of the claims in a trust dispute to 
continue.237 In other words, the non-arbitrability of certain 
                                                
	
	
234 In particular, the jurisdiction to decide a divorce is not arbitrable. 
However, the decision as to the amount of alimony due from a former 
spouse may be arbitrable. 
235 Federal Civil Code, arts. 1368, 1372 (Mex.). 
236 Strong, supra note 106, at 302. 
237 Id. at 303. 
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claims in a trust dispute does not result in the non-
arbitrability of all trust matters. 
 
VII. CAPACITY TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION 
 
Full capacity of all parties to the arbitration 
agreement in a Mexican trust is required for its effective 
enforcement (see Section IV above). Generally, it is settled 
that the capacity or authorization to contract on behalf of 
another will suffice to establish the capacity to arbitrate.238 
However, the question regarding which law arbitrators shall 
apply to determine a party’s capacity is not easily answered. 
As mentioned above, Article V(1)(a) of the New York 
Convention does not set forth the law governing the capacity 
or power to enter into an arbitration agreement.239 With that 
being said, the delegates at the New York Conference left the 
question of which law should govern capacity open so that it 
could be answered by the conflict of laws rules of the state 
court faced with a motion to deny enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement under Article II(3) or of an arbitration 
award under Article V(I)(a) New York Convention.240 
                                                
	
	
238 JEAN- FRANCOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 232-233 (Stephen V. Berti & Annette Ponti 
eds., 2d ed. 2007); Konstantin Razumov, The Law Governing the Capacity to 
Arbitrate, PLANNING EFFICIENT ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS: THE LAW 
APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 260 (Albert Jan van-den-
Berg ed. 1996). 
239 Despite the fact that pursuant to Art. V(1)(a) of the New York 
Convention, the recognition and enforcement of an award may be 
denied where the parties to the arbitration agreement were under some 
incapacity, the New York Convention does not define the law governing 
capacity or the power to enter into an arbitration agreement. See 
FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 90, at 244. 
240 POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 239, at 233-34. 
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Against this background, arbitrators should also 
consider applying the conflict of laws provisions of the 
forum judge at the place of arbitration or of the state court of 
enforcement (although arbitrators are not bound by the 
conflict of laws rules of state courts at the place of arbitration 
or enforcement).241 This approach helps to shield an arbitral 
tribunal’s award against setting aside claims at the place of 
arbitration and to enhance enforcement at the relevant 
jurisdictions.  
In this section, we address questions of capacity that 
may arise in the context of arbitration agreements in a 
Mexican trust. These questions will be analyzed from the 
perspective of an arbitral tribunal seated in Mexico, applying 
the Mexican courts’ conflict of laws rules located in the 
Mexico CC. On the one hand, Article 13(II) of the CC 
provides that the capacity of a natural person is decided by 
the law of the country where he/she has his/her domicile.242 
On the other hand, Article 2736 states that the capacity of 
legal entities is assessed in accordance with the law of their 
incorporation.243 
 
A. CAPACITY OF SETTLORS AND TRUSTEES 
 
Pursuant to Article 384 of the General Law of 
Securities and Credit Operations a settlor shall have capacity 
to transfer the property or rights in trust to the trustees.244 In 
this line of thought, a natural person domiciled in Mexico 
would have the capacity to act as settlor and to enter into an 
                                                
	
	
241 Id. 
242 Federal Civil Code, art. 13(II) (Mex.). 
243 Id. art. 2736 (Mex.). 
244 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 384 (Mex.). 
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arbitration agreement if he or she has the capacity to contract 
on real and personal rights. The general principle under 
Mexican law is that any person who has not been declared 
incapacitated by law has capacity to contract.245 Under 
Mexican law, natural persons lacking capacity to contract 
will include minors, those lacking sufficient mental 
maturity, and those suffering from mental illnesses or those 
affected by circumstances that do not allow them to exercise 
their rights. For example, bankrupt traders, the demented, 
and prisoners.246 The same provisions govern the capacity of 
settlors in the context of business trusts.247 
Legal entities have the capacity to transfer and 
acquire goods and rights through most of the ways 
established by law, just as natural persons do. However, an 
entity’s capacity may be limited by law and its documents of 
incorporation. For example, a limitation to an entity’s 
capacity derives from the company’s object or purpose. In 
this sense, a legal entity’s representatives can only bind the 
company to those agreements which are within its purpose 
of incorporation and according to the scope of authorization 
given by the documents of incorporation or bylaws. The law 
also imposes limits to certain types of legal persons. For 
                                                
	
	
245 Federal Civil Code, art. 1798 (Mex.).  
246 Id. at art. 450(I) and (II); see also id. at arts. 1306-1308 (provisions on the 
capacity to make a will that may apply by analogy to settlors); RICARDO 
TREVIÑO-GARCÍA, LOS CONTRATOS CIVILES Y SUS GENERALIDADES 48, 49 
(McGraw Hill 5th ed. 2002). 
247 Federal Civil Code, art. 81 (Mex.) (Natural and legal persons must 
first have legal capacity under the Civil Codes in order to perform trade 
activities. Persons who cannot be bound by their own regular conduct 
equally lack capacity to perform commercial transactions. Consequently, 
the provisions on legal capacity contained in the Civil Codes are 
applicable to the commercial contracts subject to modifications and 
restrictions imposed by the Code of Commerce). 
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example, foundations (asociaciones civiles under Mexican law) 
are not allowed to have the for-profit trade of merchandise 
as their purpose. 
In the context of Mexican trusts, unless a legal person 
incorporated under Mexican law acting as settlor or any 
financial or credit institution authorized to act as trustee,248 
is expressly precluded by its articles of incorporation and 
internal rules from agreeing to arbitration, nothing in 
Mexican law would limit their legal capacity to enter into 
such an arbitration agreement.  
 
B. CAPACITY OF MINORS AND INCAPACITATED 
BENEFICIARIES 
 
Settlors of family and testamentary trusts frequently 
designate beneficiaries who are minors or incapacitated 
pursuant to Mexican law, causing two issues to arise. First, 
whether a minor or incapacitated beneficiary may consent to 
an arbitration agreement. Second, whether a minor or 
incapacitated may participate in the arbitration proceedings. 
As a starting point, minors lack capacity to contract thus, 
any arbitration provisions agreed to by a minor or 
incapacitated beneficiary using his or her own name will be 
invalid (see Section A above). Yet, parents or tutors could 
consent to arbitration on behalf of children or persons under 
guardianship.249 The same is valid with respect to a minor or 
impaired person’s capacity to present their case before an 
arbitral tribunal. Any due process issue would be resolved if 
such person is a duly represented by their parents, tutors, or 
lawyers.  
                                                
	
	
248 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 385 (Mex.).  
249 GONZALEZ-DE-COSSIO, supra note 208, at 149.  
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With that being said, Mexican law appears to impose 
some conditions regarding the above circumstances. On one 
hand, Article 424 of the CC provides that minors may 
neither appear in trial nor acquire any obligation without the 
express consent of their parents.250 Though no reference to 
arbitration is made in this provision, one could conclude that 
Mexican law requires that a parent manifest consent in an 
express manner for a minor to be able to participate in 
arbitration proceedings. Pursuant to Mexican contract law, 
express consent is manifested verbally, in writing, by 
electronic or optic means or any other technology, or 
through unequivocal signs.251 In other words, a parent’s tacit 
intent resulting from acts or conduct will be insufficient to 
bind a minor child to arbitration.252 
With regard to persons under guardianship (tutela), 
Mexican law conditions a tutor’s freedom to submit the 
minor or incapacitated beneficiary’s matters to arbitration 
and to nominate arbitrators upon approval by the Mexican 
courts.253 It is unclear whether this requirement extends to a 
parent-child relationship or whether it is limited to the 
tutors- incapacitated minors relationship.  One could argue 
that it does not extend beyond tutors-incapacitated minors 
relationships, since parents are not subject to strict 
supervision rules that tutors or guardians are under Mexican 
law.254 Different legal treatment resides on the fact that 
                                                
	
	
250 Federal Civil Code, art. 424 (Mex.). 
251 Id. at art. 1803(I) (Mex.). 
252 Id. at art. 1803(II) (Mex.).  
253 Id. at arts. 566, 567 (Mex.).  
254 See e.g., id. at art. 418 (specific rules stating that guardians are subject 
to the same obligations and restrictions established for tutors. However, 
no similar rules subject parents to the same obligations and restrictions 
imposed on tutors.). 
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tutors are designated by law, while parents become 
responsible for their children by natural circumstances that 
morally lead them to act on their childrens’ best interest with 
no need for court supervision. Accordingly, only tutors, not 
parents, need the Mexican courts’ authorization to agree 
upon and represent minors and incapacitated beneficiaries 
in arbitration proceedings arising out of Mexican trust 
disputes.  
 
VIII. JOINDER OF PARTIES 
 
Despite the fact that globalization has brought with it 
a growing number of multi-party and long-term 
relationships, most commercial contracts are short-term and 
still only involve two parties. Trust agreements, on the other 
hand, involve long-term relationships, which typically last 
longer than most commercial contracts. A Mexican trust may 
have a 50-year (renewable) term.255 Presumably, more than 
one dispute could arise during the trust term. Most 
importantly, trust disputes usually involve more than two 
parties and occasionally it may not be possible to predict 
who those parties will be in advance.256 When a dispute 
arises between the trustee and the settlor, it may also involve 
the beneficiaries if the claims address the performance of the 
trust terms. If the trust indicates a class of persons as 
beneficiaries, those who are entitled to the benefits will also 
have an interest in joining the arbitration as parties. 
Similarly, when a dispute arises between the beneficiaries, it 
will most likely also involve the trustee and the settlor if the 
matter concerns interpretation of the trust terms.  
                                                
	
	
255 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 394(II) (Mex.). 
256 Koch, supra note 3, at 185. 
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Therefore, arbitration must guarantee some 
procedural efficiency in this regard. We submit that 
arbitration currently has the tools to meet these particular 
needs of trust disputes. Most institutional rules empower the 
institution or the arbitrators to decide on joinder issues. For 
the purpose of this work, we will address the relevant 
provisions in the ICC Rules 2012 and the Mexico Arbitration 
Center Rules 2009. Arbitral institutions are increasingly 
requested to join parties covered by the same arbitration 
agreement during the proceedings.257 Institutions will accept 
such requests if all parties participate in the composition of 
the arbitral tribunal on equal terms.258 This condition results 
from arbitration laws establishing that an arbitral award 
may be set aside or refused enforcement if a party was not 
given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or if 
the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties.259 Article 
V(1)(b)(d) of the New York Convention sets forth the same 
                                                
	
	
257 From 2007 to 2011 the ICC Court of Arbitration handled 55 requests 
for joinder of additional parties; 70% involved one additional party, 15% 
two additional parties and 15% three or more additional parties. See 
JASON FRY ET AL., THE SECRETARIAT’S GUIDE TO ICC ARBITRATION 98 (Moss 
et al., eds. 2012). 
258 State courts do not face much difficulty in joinder issues since state 
courts can decide to consolidate claims pertaining to the same parties 
involved in pending proceedings in a different court or to join additional 
parties to current proceedings if their rules on jurisdiction so provide. A 
state judge remains neutral before the parties because state judges decide 
cases based on territorial, subject matter, or venue rules, but not because 
of the parties’ appointment or agreement. 
259 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(ii), (iv), 
36(1)(a)(ii), (iv); Commercial Code, arts. 1457(I)(b), (d), 1462(I)(b), (d) 
(Mex.). 
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grounds for denying the enforcement of arbitration 
awards.260 
The duty to include all relevant parties to the 
arbitration should rest upon the parties themselves, not 
upon the arbitral tribunal.261 Preferably, this should happen 
at the outset of the proceedings. A beneficiary who requests 
arbitration against the trustee shall, in addition, name in his 
or her request all beneficiaries of the trust who may 
eventually have an interest either as claimant or as 
respondent in the proceedings. Similarly, a trustee who 
submits a request for arbitration against a beneficiary shall 
also name all other beneficiaries who may have an interest in 
appearing in the arbitration proceedings as parties.262 Where 
the claimant and eventually the respondent properly 
designate in their first submission (request for arbitration or 
answer to the request, respectively) all claimants and all 
respondents concerned by the type of trust claim, the arbitral 
institution will ensure notification of the claims and 
counterclaims, if any, to all parties mentioned.  
Early designation of all parties concerned by any trust 
claims will permit a joint nomination of one co-arbitrator by 
the group of claimants and/or a joint nomination of one co-
arbitrator by the group of respondents if a three-member 
tribunal is to be constituted.263 Where a sole arbitrator is to 
                                                
	
	
260 N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(b)(d). 
261 Wüstemann, supra note 130, at 54. 
262 Blaine Covington Janin, The Validity of Arbitration Provisions in Trust 
Instruments, 55 CALIF. L. REVIEW 521, 533 (1967). 
263 See e.g., ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 12(6); RULES OF 
ARBITRATION CENTER OF MEXICO art. 16(1) (Centro De Arbitraje De 
Mexico, ed., 2009), available at 
http://www.camex.com.mx/images/pdf/reglas%20de%20arbitraje%20
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be appointed, prompt designation of all parties concerned 
will also permit a joint-nomination by all parties.264 Failure 
to agree on a joint-nomination by one group alone will 
prompt the arbitral institution to step in to appoint all 
arbitrators for all parties (claimants and respondents) under 
many arbitration rules.265 The purpose of this across-the-
board measure (Article 12(8) ICC Rules) is to ensure equality 
between the parties in the composition of an arbitral 
tribunal.266 As explained in the ICC Secretariat Commentary 
on the ICC Rules 2012: 
 
Where all the parties in one side are unable to 
agree on a choice of a co-arbitrator, the Court 
can deny all the parties in the arbitration the 
right to nominate an arbitrator, if appropriate. 
This prevents one party or one side from 
having a perceived or actual advantage over 
the other in respect of the arbitral tribunal’s 
constitution.267  
Article 12(8) of the ICC Rules addresses the decision 
by the French Cour de Cassation in the BKMI v. Dutco case.268 
In that case, any dispute had to be solved by a three-member 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
del%20cam%20adoptadas%20por%20arias%20mexico.pdf [hereinafter 
“CAMEX Rules”]. 
264 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 12(3); CAMEX Rules, 
supra note 263, at art. 14(3)(a) 
265 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 12(8); CAMEX Rules, 
supra note 263, art. 16(2). 
266 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 12(8). 
267 FRY, supra note 239, at 258. 
268 BKMI Industrienlagen GmbH & Siemens AG v. Dutco Construction, 
Cour de Cassation (1er Chambre Civile), Pourvoi N° 89-18708 89-18726, 
Jan. 7, 1992, Revue de l’Arbitrage (1992), at 472, KLUWER ARBITRATION. 
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arbitral tribunal nominated in accordance with the ICC 
Rules.269 Dutco, the claimant, nominated a co-arbitrator who 
was confirmed by the ICC Court.270 The ICC Court then 
directed the two respondents to nominate their co-arbitrator 
jointly.271 The respondents protested against both of them 
being required to nominate one co-arbitrator jointly, but 
eventually did so.272 When the arbitral tribunal was 
composed, the respondents again challenged the 
composition of the tribunal arguing that they should have 
each been entitled to nominate one arbitrator in order to be 
on equal terms with the claimant.273 The arbitral tribunal 
dismissed the challenge and the respondents moved to set 
aside the award before French court.274 The Cour de Cassation 
admitted the challenge holding that all parties are entitled to 
equality of treatment, including in the process of selecting 
the arbitral tribunal.275 
                                                
	
	
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 Passage from the decision in the original French language: “qu’il y 
était stipulé que tous différends seront tranchés selon le règlement 
d'arbitrage de la Chambre de commerce internationale, par trois arbitres 
nommés conformément à ce règlement; que, sur la demande d'arbitrage 
unique présentée par la société Dutco, séparément, contre ses deux 
cocontractantes pour des créances distinctes concernant celles-ci, un 
tribunal arbitral a été constitué de trois arbitres dont un désigné 
conjointement par les deux défenderesses avec protestations et réserves; 
que le tribunal a jugé qu'il avait été régulièrement constitué et que la 
procédure arbitrale devait se poursuivre sous la forme multipartite 
contre les deux défenderesses.” BKMI Industrienlagen GmbH & Siemens 
AG v. Dutco Construction, Revue de l’Arbitrage (1992), at 472, KLUWER 
ARBITRATION. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
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The appointment of all arbitrators for both sides by 
the arbitral institution eliminates any apparent advantage of 
one side over the other regarding the arbitral tribunal’s 
composition and is not deemed an infringement of Article 
V(1)(b)(d) New York Convention,276 or similar provisions.277  
In case a party is requested to be joined to the 
proceedings (or a party requests to be joined) after the first 
exchange of submissions, arbitral institutions take different 
approaches to comply with the parties’ right to participate in 
the composition of the arbitral tribunal. The ICC Rules 
require the submission of a request for joinder (which has 
the same effects as a request for arbitration).278 The request 
for joinder shall be made before the confirmation or 
appointment of any arbitrator, unless all parties agree 
otherwise.279 In practice, the ICC Secretariat will advise the 
parties in advance of this cut-off point280 and set a time limit 
for filing any request for joinder before any arbitrator is 
finally confirmed or appointed. The ICC Court will then 
make a prima facie assessment of the existence of an 
arbitration agreement covering the additional party.281 A 
                                                
	
	
276 Since the parties are then deemed to have been given the opportunity 
to appoint their arbitrators and the default appointment by the arbitral 
institution is made in accordance with the arbitration agreement that 
incorporates the arbitral institution’s rules.  
277 Commercial Code, arts. 1457(I)(b) ,(d), 1462(I)(b), (d) (Mex.).   
278 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 7(1). 
279 Id. 
280 FRY, supra note 258, at 99. 
281 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at arts. 7(1), 6(3-7) (pursuant to 
the current rules the Secretariat of the ICC will decide which challenges 
to the arbitration agreement shall be decided by the arbitral tribunal and 
which shall be referred to the court for a prima facie determination–only 
those cases where jurisdiction may be at issue will be referred to the 
court); FRY, supra note 258, at 67-68, 95.  
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timely request for joinder will be subsequently transferred to 
the parties concerned by the ICC Court’s Secretariat. The 
receiving parties will have thirty days to submit an answer 
to the request for joinder.282  
The additional party will thus be permitted to jointly 
nominate a co-arbitrator with the side it joined pursuant to 
Article 12(6).283 Where the additional party is unable to agree 
with one of the existing parties on a joint-nomination of a co-
arbitrator, the institution will appoint all arbitrators for all 
parties in accordance with Article 12(8).284 
However, the requirement to ensure equal treatment 
in the process of composing the arbitral tribunal is not 
absolute. If all parties agree, a request for joinder may be 
accepted after the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.285 In 
the context of trust disputes, it should not be uncommon 
that a trustee and a beneficiary agree upon other 
beneficiaries becoming a party to proceedings after the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Indeed, this issue may 
be addressed in advance in the arbitration clause of a trust 
deed. The following wording may ensure the joinder of 
additional parties in such circumstances: 
 
All disputes arising out of or in connection 
with the trust created hereunder shall be 
finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of 
the [institution] (the “Rules”) by one or more 
arbitrators who shall be exclusively 
appointed by the [institution]. All parties 
                                                
	
	
282 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 7(3). 
283 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 12(6). 
284 FRY, supra note 258, at 150-51. 
285 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 7(1). 
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hereby agree that additional parties may be 
joined to the proceedings before or after the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Upon its 
constitution, the arbitral tribunal shall decide 
any request for joinder in accordance with the 
Rules. 
The Mexico Arbitration Center Rules do not contain 
specific provisions on joinder of parties. However, the same 
solution should ensue from Article 16(2) of the Mexico 
Arbitration Center Rules.286 A joinder of additional parties 
may be possible at any moment before the arbitral tribunal is 
constituted. The parties’ freedom to tailor the proceedings 
must permit them to agree otherwise in an arbitration clause 
or during the proceedings. 
 
IX. EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRAL AWARDS IN MEXICAN TRUST 
DISPUTES 
 
The efficiency of an arbitral award is closely 
dependent upon the enforceable character of the arbitration 
agreement that gives it origin and the fulfillment of equal 
treatment and due process principles. The UNCITRAL 
Model Law sets out the reasons for which a court at the 
place of arbitration may set aside an arbitral award as well 
as the reasons for which a court may refuse enforcement of a 
domestic (or a non-New York Convention) arbitral award.287 
The reasons for setting aside awards actually mirror those 
                                                
	
	
286 CAMEX Rules, supra note 263, at art. 16(2). 
287 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34, 36. 
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for refusing enforcement,288 and are inspired by Article V of 
the New York Convention.  
Most of these reasons, also textually adopted in 
Mexican arbitration law,289 have been addressed in the prior 
sections of this work. They consider the existence of a valid 
arbitration agreement among the parties (Section V 
above),290 the arbitrability of the claims at stake (Section VI 
above),291 the capacity of the parties to submit to arbitration 
(Section VII above),292 and the proper constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal (Section VIII above).293 
In this section, we focus on one major reason that 
arbitral awards are set aside or that parties are denied 
enforcement: public policy. Like the other grounds analyzed 
above, we will approach the public policy exception from 
the Mexican law standpoint.294 The remaining reasons based 
                                                
	
	
288 Except for the fact that the enforcement court may also considered the 
fact that the award has been set aside at the place of arbitration for 
denying enforcement. Id. at art. 36(2). 
289 Commercial Code, arts. 1457, 1462 (Mex.). 
290 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(i) and 36 
(1)(a)(i); N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(a); Commercial 
Code, arts. 1457(I)(a), 1462(I)(a) (Mex.).  
291 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(b)(i), 36(1)(b)(i); 
N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(2)(a); Commercial Code, arts. 
1457(II), 1462(II) (Mex.).  
292 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(i), 36(1)(a)(i); 
N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(a); Commercial Code, arts. 
1457(I)(a), 1462(I)(a) (Mex.).  
293 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(ii), (iv), 
36(1)(a)(ii), (iv); N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(i)(b), (d); 
Commercial Code, arts. 1457(I)(b), (d), 1462(I)(b), (d) (Mex.). 
294 This makes sense because settlors and trustees of Mexican trusts will 
most likely choose Mexico as a place of arbitration. One could easily 
forecast that financial institutions agreeing upon arbitration will want to 
keep the arbitration proceedings under the supervision of Mexican 
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on ultra petita decisions295 or failure to provide proper notice 
of the proceedings296 contemplated by the UNCITRAL 
Model Law or the New York Convention do not seem to 
raise any particular issue in relation to trust disputes.  
Like in other jurisdictions, Mexican courts and 
scholars have struggled to define what public policy means 
in the context of arbitration.297 As a starting point, an arbitral 
decision will be set aside or refused enforcement only when 
it infringes on “basic notions of moral and justice” of 
Mexico’s legal system.298 Yet, nobody would dare to propose 
a list of components of Mexican morals and justice. 
Therefore, scholars have rather taken the approach of 
explaining what public policy in arbitration is not. We share 
Gonzalez-de-Cossio’s view that the purpose of this 
exception is to prevent giving legal effect to institutions that 
are contrary to the most valuable principles of Mexican 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
courts and Mexican mandatory rules of law. In this case, Mexican public 
policy will be relevant in case of annulment actions against the award. In 
the event parties select a place of arbitration outside of Mexico, or where 
the arbitral tribunal so determines, public policy pursuant to Mexican 
law will then be relevant at the stage of enforcement of the arbitral 
award. Since only Mexico-based financial and credit institutions may act 
as trustees, any arbitration award that may not be voluntarily complied 
with by the trustees will have to be enforced in Mexico. In this regard, all 
parties involved in a Mexican trust arbitration have a legitimate interest 
in knowing whether the Mexican notion of public policy could 
jeopardize the enforcement of an arbitration award in Mexico.  
295 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(ii)–(iv), 
36(1)(a)(ii)–(iv); N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(b)–(d); 
Commercial Code, arts. 1457(I)(b)–(d), 1462(I)(b)–(d) (Mex.).  
296 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(ii), 36(1)(a)(ii); 
N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(i)(b); Commercial Code, arts. 
1457(I)(b), 1462 (I)(b) (Mex.).  
297 GONZALEZ-DE-COSSIO, supra note 208, at 797-800. 
298 Id. at 800. 
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law.299 In this line of thought, it is improper to consider that 
an arbitrator’s incorrect interpretation or application of what 
are usually deemed mandatory norms of law under Mexican 
law constitutes a breach of Mexican public policy. Only 
arbitral decisions that go against the mandatory norms of 
law that embody basic notions of morals and justice in 
Mexico can give rise to the exception of public policy.300 
Against this background, this work does not intend to 
define the elusive notion of public policy or verify the 
accuracy of the contours drawn by Mexican case law or 
scholars. In lieu of this, we identify two examples of 
mandatory norms of law that could give rise to the public 
policy exception in the context of arbitration of Mexican 
trusts disputes.301  
The first case involves testamentary trusts.302 Certain 
mandatory rules of law may affect the validity of a Mexican 
revocable trust when the settlor passes away. Pursuant to 
Article 1374 of the CC, a testament failing to provide 
allowance for the benefit of legally protected dependents 
will be invalid.303 These include the deceased’s children, 
widows, concubines, parents, and siblings who are 
incapacitated to work or do not possess enough assets to 
                                                
	
	
299 Id. at 801. 
300 Id. at 801-02. 
301 Other situations may also raise the public policy exception in the 
context of arbitral awards derived from Mexican trust disputes. 
However, those other situations could also probably arise in the context 
of a typical commercial arbitration.  
302 In addition to being written, a testamentary trust shall comply with 
the solemnities and form validity requirements of testaments and wills. 
See JOSE ARCE-Y-CERVANTES, DE LAS SUCESIONES 148 (Porrúa 10th edicion 
2011). 
303 The original in Spanish reads: “Es inoficioso el testamento en que no 
se deje la pensión alimenticia, según lo establecido en este Capítulo.” 
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subsist and were entitled to allowance at the time of death.304 
An arbitral award giving effect to the terms of a revocable 
testamentary trust that fails to consider as beneficiaries, to 
the extent required by law,305 any legally protected-
dependent, could be partially or totally set aside or refused 
enforcement based on Mexican public policy. In principle, 
the arbitral tribunal should have considered the mandatory 
nature of Article 1374 and issued an arbitral award in those 
terms. However, the arbitral tribunal may only consider the 
application of Article 1374 on two conditions, the first being 
where one of the parties involved has so requested. If not, 
the award would be made ultra petita.306 The second is where 
the party affected by or benefiting from such an award is a 
party to the arbitration agreement. If the affected or 
benefitting party is not a party to the agreement, the arbitral 
tribunal would lack jurisdiction ratione personae, thus 
demanding that the decision concerning the third person be 
set aside or refused enforcement.307 
The second case regards disputes arising out of so-
called trusts over real estate located in the Mexican 
                                                
	
	
304 Federal Civil Code, arts. 1368, 1371 (Mex.).  
305 Pursuant to Mexican law the terms of the testamento inoficioso are 
annulled only to the extent the total of the deceased’s estate is not 
enough to provide alimony and allowance to the deceased’s protected 
dependents.  
306 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(ii)–(iv), 
36(1)(a)(ii)–(iv); N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(i)(b)–(d); 
Commercial Code, arts. 1457(I)(b)–(d), 1462(I)(b)–(d) (Mex.).  
307 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(i), 36(1)(a)(i); 
N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(a); Commercial Code, arts. 
1457(I)(a), 1462 (I)(a) (Mex.).  
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Restricted Zone.308 Pursuant to Article 27(I) of the Mexico 
Constitution, foreign persons are barred from acquiring 
direct ownership of lands and waters within a hundred 
kilometers along the country boarders and within fifty 
kilometers of the seacoast.309 The usual way to circumvent 
this constitutional prohibition is to hold the property in a 
Mexican trust. Since foreigners cannot technically “buy” 
property in that zone, the seller will act as settlor in order to 
transfer the real property to the trustee, a bank’s fiduciary 
department. The trustee then holds ownership title for the 
benefit of the designated foreign beneficiary pursuant to 
Articles 10-14 Mexico Foreign Investment Law.310 Arbitrators 
may not disregard the mandatory provisions in the Mexican 
Constitution and Foreign Investment Law. In this order of 
ideas, arbitrators shall apply the ownership restrictions 
regarding the real property transferred in trust. Any arbitral 
decision granting property title to a foreign person in 
contravention of the above mandatory provisions will be set 
aside or refused enforcement in Mexico. 
 
X. CONCLUSION 
 
As the foregoing analysis suggests, arbitration of 
Mexican trust disputes raises important issues that must be 
kept in mind by parties and arbitrators. None of these issues, 
however, present an insurmountable obstacle to the 
                                                
	
	
308 The restricted zone is composed of land located 100 kilometers next to 
international borders, and 50 kilometers from Mexican costliness. See 
LIEX, art. 2o(VI) (Mex.). 
309 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CP], art. 27(I), 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] (Feb. 5, 1917), últimas reformas 
DOF Feb. 10, 2014 (Mex.). 
310 See LIEX, arts. 10-14 (Mex.). 
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arbitration process. Leaving aside claims pertaining to 
minors or incapacitated persons that are perhaps specific to 
family trust disputes, the issues analyzed above are not 
exclusive to trust relationships. They are common in modern 
arbitration involving non-signatories and more than two 
parties.  
As shown above, the contractual nature of the 
Mexican trust (and generally of the trust institution in civil 
law jurisdictions) relieves any arbitration from jurisdictional 
challenges frequently faced by arbitral tribunals dealing 
with Anglo-American trust claims in common law 
jurisdictions. An arbitration provision contained in a 
Mexican trust deed undoubtedly covers any disputes arising 
out of or in connection with the trust agreement between 
settlors, fiduciaries, and ascertainable beneficiaries. 
Moreover, modern arbitration laws and institutional 
rules are well-equipped with provisions to address non-
signatory and multi-party cases efficiently. Additionally, 
careful design of arbitration clauses and early service of all 
parties concerned by a trust dispute should enhance the 
efficiency of the process in these cases. 
Arbitration of Mexican trust disputes remains 
underdeveloped.  This may be due to the prevailingly small 
number of domestic arbitrations taking place in Mexico 
(compared to the large number of international arbitration 
cases seated in Mexico or involving Mexican parties). There 
are various possibilities as to why domestic arbitration 
matters are much less prevalent than international ones: the 
high cost of arbitration proceedings (in a country where 
litigation before state courts is free), the deep-rooted court 
litigation culture, lawyers’ unsound suspicion about the one-
instance process offered by arbitration, and insufficient 
education and training on arbitration.  
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However, in the case of trust arbitration, these 
possibilities may not be valid. The trust lawyer community 
in Mexico is a sophisticated one. Half of its lawyers work as 
in-house counsel in highly specialized fiduciary departments 
at banks and credit institutions authorized to act as trustees. 
The other half of these lawyers are usually members of mid-
size or big law firms accustomed to deal with complex 
contractual, financial, and corporate matters, many 
involving foreign elements. The price of arbitration is 
therefore not a concern. In the same vein, the one-time 
nature of arbitration will always make sense for corporate 
trustees who allocate more value to financial and legal cost 
predictability.  
The ultimate answer may lie in the fact that little has 
been discussed about the specific advantages offered by 
arbitration to trust parties and the issues that could arise this 
field. Despite this article’s intention to furnish a compressive 
analysis and strong evidence on the benefits of arbitration 
for trust disputes and the legal compatibility between the 
Mexican trust and various arbitration laws, additional 
discussion and promotion are necessary in Mexico and in 
other civil law jurisdictions. 
In addition, empirical research about the perception 
and use of arbitration among the members of the Mexican 
trust community is necessary. The results of such empirical 
research may clear out any invalid assumptions about 
arbitration and pave the way towards a more significant role 
for arbitration as a fair and efficient means to settle Mexican 
trust claims. 
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